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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 530D,1 sent a letter to Speaker of the House John A. Boehner
to advise Congress that President Obama had instructed the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to cease defending Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of
Justice . . . establishes or implements a formal or informal policy to refrain . . . from enforcing,
applying, or administering any provision of any Federal statute . . . on the grounds that such
provision is unconstitutional . . . .”).
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(DOMA) in litigation challenging its constitutionality.2 According to the
letter, the federal definition of “marriage” as the “legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife”3 “violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment” by discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation.4 Attorney General Holder asserted that classifications
based on sexual orientation—the standard for which has not yet been set by
the Supreme Court—should receive heightened scrutiny, not rational basis
review, as some courts have already held.5 Noting the rarity of such a
nondefense decision, Holder explained that the executive branch would
continue to enforce DOMA until congressional repeal or “the judicial branch
renders a definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”6
In a press release, Speaker Boehner declared that “[t]he constitutionality
of this law should be determined by the courts—not by the President
unilaterally.”7 The Speaker’s retort ignored the Attorney General’s explanation that “[e]xecutive agencies [would] continue to comply with Section 3 of
DOMA,” because “[t]his course of action respects the actions of the prior
Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes the judiciary as the final
arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”8
In this Comment, I assess and suggest modifications for the framework
under which Presidents decide not to defend statutes they view as unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.9 I
argue that nondefense decisions based on equal protection principles should

2 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter],
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
3 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); see also id. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife.”).
4 Holder Letter, supra note 2.
5 See id. (citing cases).
6 Id.
7 Press Release, Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, Statement
by House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.speaker.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=227372.
8 See Holder Letter, supra note 2.
9 Throughout this Comment, my references to equal protection refer to the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment first recognized in Bolling v. Sharpe. See 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954) (holding that where states were prohibited from certain actions under the Equal Protection
Clause, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government”); see also, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995)
(explaining that “the equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments [are] indistinguishable” and citing cases standing for this principle).
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be treated differently than those based on other considerations.10 Specifically,
when the President believes that the courts should apply heightened
scrutiny where they currently do not, he has a duty not only to decline to
defend the statute, but also to instruct the DOJ to argue this position before
the courts. The modified framework that I ultimately offer for nondefense
decisions incorporates considerations that target equal protection cases.
Throughout my argument, I seek to contribute to the nondefense dialogue
by addressing two issues in particular. First, scholars and members of
Congress have expressed concerns that President Obama’s decision not to
defend DOMA sets us on a slippery slope to further Executive power grabs.
But my focus on equal protection, and later careful analysis of President
Obama’s decision, proves that these concerns are unfounded. The additional
authority for deciding not to defend a statute like DOMA finds support in
countermajoritarian principles and the balance of harm to individuals
weighed against the value of respecting the separation of powers. The
modifications I offer to Walter Dellinger’s nonenforcement decisionmaking
framework11 adapt it from facilitating presidential nonenforcement decisions
to informing presidential nondefense decisions; these modifications also
help to cabin presidential nondefense decisions to equal protection violations or similarly weighty concerns by forcing the President to ask a series
of questions, the answers to which should be provided to the courts and the
public. Under—or at least influenced by—this framework, for instance, a
President who disagreed with Congress about the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause would have little room to
refuse to defend it.12 The framework I suggest is grounded in reasons why
10 There is a robust literature on presidential nonenforcement and nondefense of arguably
unconstitutional statutes, but scholars and government attorneys have not addressed whether
perceived unconstitutionality based on equal protection principles—as opposed to some other
constitutional value—should change the terms of the decision. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna
Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 526 (2012) (“There is no
principled, textual basis for why the OLC [the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel] exalts the
Executive’s pet peeve, infringements on Executive power, above violations of freedom of speech
or federalism.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1198205 (2012) (arguing that the nondefense decision can be characterized as based on the level of
doubt about the constitutionality of the provision or upon separation-of-powers principles,
without addressing whether the underlying constitutional value matters).
11 For a discussion of Dellinger’s framework, see infra Section I.B.
12 My point is not that the President and DOJ can or cannot refuse to defend statutes in
contexts beyond equal protection. Rather, such decisions will be less likely after additional
considerations are weighed. It is likewise important to point out that the President’s choice is not
a policy or a political choice. Policy may motivate a certain view or inquiry, but at most, policy
helps bring to light a legal conclusion. Dellinger’s framework and my modifications make explicit
that policy disagreement with a duly enacted statute, without more, is not a valid ground for
nondefense.
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equal protection nondefense decisions deserve greater solicitude, and adds
to Dellinger’s considerations the important idea that the President’s
nondefense might actually influence the Supreme Court in its ultimate
judgment—not constitute that judgment itself. The model accounts for
important separation-of-powers principles by recognizing both the primacy
of judicial review, but also the influence of the Executive in going beyond
mere prediction and instead helping guide the path of the case law.
Second, nondefense decisions should not be considered the same as
nonenforcement decisions, regardless of whether scholars think that equal
treatment of the two decisions is justified as a matter of theory or principle.13
In this Comment, I offer some observations on the existence of the distinction and why it matters: it can both influence the President’s initial decision
and also be leveraged by the President and DOJ in important ways.
Splitting the difference by deciding to enforce a law while refusing to
defend it can help to balance important equal protection values with
significant separation-of-powers concerns. As the ongoing DOMA litigation
demonstrates, such a course of action might actually increase interbranch
dialogue.
I begin in Part I with the necessary background for addressing any nonenforcement or nondefense decisions. I first consider the constitutional
authority for nonenforcement and nondefense and observe that it is fairly
settled that the President can refuse to defend a law that he views as
unconstitutional, and recognized, even if over vigorous dissent, that he
might choose not to enforce it. The issue then becomes how the President
should make such a nondefense decision. I posit that Walter Dellinger’s
framework for deciding when the President can refuse to enforce a law,
along with the relevant modifications that Dawn Johnsen has suggested
(which together I call the “Dellinger/Johnsen framework”), serves as a
useful starting point for answering this question.
In Part II, I address some of the relevant distinctions between nonenforcement and nondefense, and by examining and elaborating on the
Dellinger and Johnsen frameworks, I show that they apply equally well, if
not better, to nondefense decisions. I am concerned in particular with the
observations that nondefense, more so than nonenforcement, respects the
separation of powers, facilitates judicial review, and considers changed
circumstances.
Then, in Part III, I observe that, while the President’s authority not to
defend a statute may vary, the equal protection context is a uniquely
13 See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 522 (arguing that Presidents should neither
enforce nor defend laws they deem unconstitutional); see also infra note 71.
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significant arena for presidential nondefense decisions. While Neal Devins
and Saikrishna Prakash have argued that Article I of the Constitution does
not support treating various constitutional values any differently for
purposes of nondefense,14 there are in fact significant reasons for viewing
equal protection as deserving special treatment. I contend that where the
President believes that courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, should
apply heightened scrutiny but nonetheless fears that the Court will instead
underenforce the Constitution by applying rational basis review, he has an
enhanced responsibility to alert the Court by not defending the objectionable statute. In this endeavor, I incorporate the underenforcement theories of
scholars such as Larry Sager, as well as offer numerous examples of the
Executive’s historical influence on the Court. Finally, I present a modified
model that incorporates these relevant factors bearing on equal protection
analysis into the nondefense inquiry.
Part IV serves as a real-life example. I apply this modified model to
President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA to illustrate how his
decisionmaking process correctly addressed all of the prongs of this discretionary framework and, in the process, has respected the separation of
powers by continuing to enable—and indeed soliciting—judicial resolution
of DOMA’s constitutionality.
I. THE DELLINGER/JOHNSEN FRAMEWORK
AND THE NONDEFENSE CONTEXT
President Obama was not the first to consider not defending a statute.
In fact, he could have looked to a body of historical and scholarly thought
on presidential decisions not to enforce arguably unconstitutional statutes.
In 1994, Walter Dellinger, then serving as Assistant Attorney General for
the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, addressed presidential nonenforcement of
constitutionally objectionable statutes in his memorandum, Presidential
Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes.15 The guidance
therein serves as a workable framework for a President approaching the
politically and legally challenging scenario of deciding whether, or how, to
execute a law he sees as constitutionally infirm. Because Dellinger himself
was not thinking or writing in a vacuum,16 I begin by briefly describing the
robust tradition of Executive nonenforcement behind the memorandum. I
14
15

Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 526.
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199, 199-203 (1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum].
16 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 518 (noting that “Walter Dellinger’s 1994 opinion
added several wrinkles” to preexisting thought on the issue).
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then discuss Dellinger’s framework. This tradition and Dellinger’s framework provide important background considerations for the argument for
why we should view the authority for presidential nondefense decisions as
heightened when the statute is allegedly unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.
A. Can the President Decline to Enforce or Defend a Statute?
The threshold question a President must consider when confronted with
a statute he views as violating equal protection is whether, given the
Constitution’s command in what is known as the Take Care Clause that he
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”17 he can refuse to enforce
or defend the statute at all. The answer is a qualified “yes,” as the brief
survey below of Supreme Court dicta, James Wilson’s reasoning, presidential practice, and congressional acquiescence demonstrates.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that the President can
decline to enforce or defend a constitutionally objectionable statute,18
neither does it state that the Supreme Court has the power of judicial
review. This observation underlies a legal theory known as “departmentalism,” which contends that the Executive, as a coordinate branch of government, has the authority to independently interpret the Constitution and act
accordingly.19 Armed with this authority, several Presidents have declined

17
18

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
See Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791, 829 (1999) (explaining that while other officials take an oath to support the
Constitution, the President “is its guarantor . . . he has special responsibilities to make certain that
the Constitution survives his watch”).
19 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 301 (1994) (asserting that “separation of powers does not mean equality
of powers” and that it is the Executive’s, as well as the Judiciary’s, responsibility to assess the
constitutionality of laws); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A
Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 352 (1994) (arguing for a version of departmentalism
taking into account “comparative institutional competence”); Dawn Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 108 (2004) (advocating “functional departmentalism,” a “variation
informed by past practice and the practical implications for our system of constitutional selfgovernment”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1032-33 (2004) (“Most theorists of departmentalism situate
their analysis in the context of separation of powers . . . [and] . . . ask[] how the constitutionally
assigned functions and distinctive interpretive capacities of the three branches of the federal
government should be coordinated.”); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 120 (1993) (positing that the executive branch should take into
account its own—and different—institutional concerns when interpreting the Constitution).
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to execute statutes they have found unconstitutional.20 Whether the
President is considering nonenforcement or nondefense, as a matter of
constitutional design, he will be both checked and guided by political
accountability rather than judicial authority21—at least as long as he makes
public his nondefense decisions and the bases for them.
Some Supreme Court dicta—at least as Dellinger broadly read them—
approve of nonenforcement in at least some circumstances.22 Dellinger also
marshaled the Framers’ intent as support23: James Wilson, a delegate at the
Constitutional Convention and later a Supreme Court Justice, reasoned that
if the legislature “transgress[ed] the bounds assigned to it,” not only would
judges have the “duty to pronounce [the offending act] void,” but so too
could the President “shield himself, and refuse to carry into effect an act
20 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 18, at 809 (“Thomas Jefferson ordered government attorneys not to prosecute persons under the Sedition Act. Andrew Johnson violated the Tenure of
Office Act on Constitution basis. When Woodrow Wilson ignored a statute that conditioned
removal of postmasters on Senate approval, the Court held the measure unconstitutional. No
[J]ustice even suggested Wilson had acted improperly in refusing to enforce a statute he thought
unconstitutional.”); see also Letter from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, Supreme Court of the
United States, to Gerrit Smith (Apr. 19, 1868), in JACOB WILLIAM SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND
PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 577 (1874) (“[A]cts of Congress not warranted
by the Constitution are not laws. . . . [W]here [a statute] directly attacks and impairs the
Executive power confided to [the President] by the Constitution . . . the clear duty of the
President [is] to disregard the law, so far at least as it may be necessary in order to bring the
question of its constitutionality before the judicial tribunals.”).
21 See Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527, 536 (2009)
(“If the President refuses to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds, there is little that
Congress can do . . . [outside of] impeachment.”). Instead, the checks on the President are
political in nature. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 61 (2010) (discussing checks on the President and
contending that “these checks are not primarily legal. . . . Rather legislators appeal to the court of
public opinion, which in turn constrains the President”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 113 (1999) (“[T]he President’s political incentives lead
him or her to act in a way consistent with constitutional values.” (emphasis added)); Peter L.
Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2000)
(“The political, not legal controls of the election booth, history’s regard, and impeachment on the
one side, the demands of the Constitution and the system of precedent on the other, set a
framework within which these allocations are made.”).
22 Dellinger cites, albeit selectively, a handful of cases to support his contention that judges
agree that “there are circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a
statute that he views as unconstitutional.” Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 199. See
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64, 176 (1926) (upholding the President’s dismissal of an
Executive officer in violation of a statute requiring the Senate’s approval). More significantly, in
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Justice Scalia, writing for three other justices,
commented that the President has “the power to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them
when they are unconstitutional.” 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
23 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 208-09.
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that violates the [C]onstitution.”24 In other words, just as judges can
pronounce the law unconstitutional (by exercising a power not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution), so too can the President (by invoking
another power similarly unmentioned). If neither the Court nor the
Framers has stated that only the Court can pronounce on the validity of an
act of Congress,25 then no bright-line constitutional impediment prevents
Presidents from asserting such independent interpretive authority.
Indeed, the Constitution’s open texture has allowed a number of Chief
Executives, including Thomas Jefferson,26 Andrew Jackson,27 then–former
President James Madison,28 and Abraham Lincoln29 to assert their authority
24 Statement of James Wilson on December 1, 1787, in 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL COMMISSION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 443,

446 (2d ed. 1901). It is not clear what Wilson means by “shield himself,” but he might be referring
to the President’s ability to protect himself politically. In that event, Wilson’s point would speak
to the importance of the democratic legitimacy that the President can bring to assessments of
statutes’ constitutionality.
25 This authority is distinct from who might get the final say, a point on which Chief Justice
Marshall was unequivocal. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system.”).
26 Jefferson propounded a rather virulent version of such coordinate interpretation:
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [judges] a right to decide for the Executive,
more than the Executive to decide for them. . . . The judges, believing the [Alien
and Sedition] law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. But the
Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, 310-12 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897).
27 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 183, 188-89 (2004) (describing Jackson’s veto of the Second Bank, which
he deemed unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary, and his
reassertion of Jeffersonian departmentalism); JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW
JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 211 (2008) (explaining that Jackson thought that the question of
whether “a President should not simply defer to the will and wishes of the Congress or the
judiciary,” but rather should advance his own position and speak for the people—“[w]hose vision
would prevail . . . was an open question . . . in American politics”).
28 See KRAMER, supra note 27, at 188 (noting Madison’s eschewal of departmentalism for
greater acceptance of judicial primacy and theorizing that the viewpoint stemmed from “watching
Andrew Jackson’s catfight with Congress over the Second Bank”).
29 See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 190 (2005) (noting that Lincoln attacked the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision by
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to interpret the Constitution independently. For many years, Presidents
have asserted the right to decline to enforce statutes they deem unconstitutional and have relied on their attorneys—attorneys working, in some cases,
in institutions created by Congress30—to provide legal support for their
contentions.31
Finally, Congress itself has recognized the President’s prerogative to
decline to defend (although not to decline to enforce) a constitutionally
objectionable statute. In 2002, Congress reaffirmed its tacit blessing of a
degree of presidential coordinacy—the President’s prerogative to interpret
the Constitution for himself—in a provision of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,32 which requires the
Attorney General to advise Congress when the DOJ elects not to defend a
statute.33 The few courts mentioning this provision seem unperturbed by it,34
and older cases note similar practices under earlier statutes.35 Further, the
statute’s thirty-day deadline in anticipation of “enabl[ing] the House of
Representatives and the Senate to take action . . . to intervene” in the case
of the DOJ’s nondefense36 implies congressional acceptance of departmentalism and evidences that Congress sees itself, too, as a coordinate branch

fastidiously focusing on its logical flaws); KRAMER, supra note 27, at 212 (discussing how
“Lincoln . . . had criticized Dred Scott on departmental grounds when he campaigned for the
Senate” and that, as President, he continued to ignore the Court’s opinion by “recognizing black
citizenship in a range of contexts”); Paulsen, supra note 19, at 276-84 (discussing Lincoln’s
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and refusal to cooperate with Chief Justice Taney’s
decision (while riding circuit) in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861), holding
that suspension unconstitutional).
30 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 87-88
(2010) (“[P]residents . . . can rely on two executive branch institutions—the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department and the Office of Counsel to the President in the White
House—to give their constitutional imprimatur to presidential power grabs.”)
31 E.g., Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469 (1860) (“Every law is to be
carried out so far forth as is consistent with the Constitution, and no further. The sound part of it
must be executed, and the vicious portion of it suffered to drop.”).
32 Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 8, 12, 15,
18, 21, 28, 31, 38, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
33 See supra note 1.
34 See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, Nos. 10-56634 & 10-56813, 2011 WL
2683238, at *1 (9th Cir. July 11, 2011) (accepting that “[t]he Government, of course, may refrain
from defending the constitutionality of ‘any provision of any Federal statute,’” but stating that, in
response, “the court may allow amicus curiae to participate in oral argument in support of
constitutionality” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006))).
35 See, e.g., Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting a DOJ
decision not to defend a statute and staying litigation for forty-five days, under a statute then in
effect, to enable congressional intervention).
36 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(1)–(2).
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competent to intervene in litigation to assert the constitutionality of its own
legislation.
In sum, constitutional structure and scholarship, Supreme Court dicta,
past presidential practice, and congressional acquiescence all point to the
conclusion that Presidents often have discretionary authority—subject to
political pressure—to choose whether to defend, and at times enforce, duly
enacted statutes.37 In a sense, our system of government has accepted this
practice. For example, as Adam Liptak has pointed out, one Solicitor
General’s refusal to defend a Federal Communications Commission
affirmative action program did not derail his career: “The [C]ommission
filed its own brief defending the program, and the court upheld it. The
acting Solicitor General who refused to defend the program, John G.
Roberts, Jr., is now [C]hief [J]ustice of the United States.”38
The question thus becomes what precisely a President should do, as a
discretionary matter, about a statute he views as unconstitutional.39 Should
37 There are, unsurprisingly, viable arguments for enforcing or defending a statute of questionable constitutionality. See, e.g., The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce
Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 4a Op. O.L.C. 55, 55-56 (1980) (contending that the
Attorney General “can best discharge the responsibilities of his office by defending and enforcing
the Act of Congress” since the Judiciary is the branch responsible for striking down unconstitutional legislation); Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU
L. REV. 73, 79 (1995) (“Because of the respect to which the Congress is entitled as a coordinate
branch of government, Solicitors General traditionally have recognized a general duty to defend
congressional statutes against constitutional challenges.”).
Further, the issue of whether Presidents have the authority to decline to enforce or defend
statutes before a Supreme Court decision upholding a statute’s constitutionality is different from
the issue of whether Presidents have the authority to decline to enforce or defend statutes after a
Supreme Court decision upholding the statute. While some have claimed or decried that “the
President may decline to enforce a statute that regulates private individuals when the President
deems the statute unconstitutional, even if a court has held or would hold the statute constitutional,”
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 50 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), there seems to be little to the notion
that the Executive can refuse to enforce—or defend—a statute once the Supreme Court has
declared it constitutional. For the former proposition, Judge Kavanaugh in Seven-Sky cites to
Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 906
(1991) (Scalia, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But while Justice Scalia does
assert that the President has the power “even to disregard [laws] when they are unconstitutional,”
id., he does not go as far as Judge Kavanaugh supposes: if the Supreme Court were to uphold a
law, it would not be unconstitutional. As discussed below, the Dellinger framework is appropriately
deferential to the Supreme Court’s view; the concern here is with a statute that the President
believes is unconstitutional before the Supreme Court has spoken on the matter.
38 Adam Liptak, The President’s Courthouse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at WK5.
39 Cf. Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 521 (“The duties to defend and to enforce are
anathema to the text, structure, and early history of the Constitution. . . . Rather than resting on
the Constitution, the duties to enforce and defend . . . are grounded on the bureaucratic interests
of the Department of Justice.”); Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1235 (“The question whether under
these circumstances the Executive should continue to enforce and defend these statutes is not
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the President’s exercise be solely predictive, or should he also seek to
influence the ultimate outcome of a Supreme Court decision? In other
words, must he strictly apply the Court’s legal framework, or does he have
some prerogative to evaluate the statute’s constitutionality on broader
principles?40
B. Dellinger’s Discretionary Framework
When the President chooses whether to enforce a statute he views as
unconstitutional, he needs a test to guide his decision. The 1994 Dellinger
Memorandum lays out a framework as a series of “propositions” that the
President should follow in making a nonenforcement decision.41 We can
divide these maxims by what they propose for the President’s role as
President, his role with regard to Congress, and his role with regard to the
Judiciary.
First, with respect to the President’s role as President, Dellinger first
points to the Take Care Clause42 and the Oath Clause43 for the proposition
that “the President is required to act in accordance with the laws—including
the Constitution, which takes precedence over other forms of law.”44 Part of
this duty involves seeking to avoid unconstitutional interpretations when-

governed by a legal rule derivable from the Constitution itself; it is instead a matter of judgment,
informed by a welter of historical and institutional concerns.”).
40 Cf. David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Nonenforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 69-70 (2000). As Barron argues, “the Court’s
decision to uphold a statute against constitutional challenge does not constitute a final determination that would preclude other institutional actors, unburdened as they are by equivalent
obligations of deference, from reaching a contrary conclusion.” Id. at 69. Rather, tests like rational
basis review are designed with the concern of “deference to the political branches,” id. at 70, since
“[t]he Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Id. at
77 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Given that the Court’s doctrine “reflect[s] the Court’s own conception of the limitations
of its decisional capacities,” the President might contend that “the political branches [may] make
decisions on their own [and] do the kind of implementation of constitutional meaning that the
Court will not itself perform.” Id. at 69-70.
41 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200.
42 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
43 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States.’”).
44 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200.
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ever possible and “exercis[ing] . . . independent judgment to determine
whether the statute is constitutional.”45
Second, this Take Care duty also involves deferring to Congress whenever possible. Prophylaxis is preferable: the President should endeavor to
correct unconstitutional provisions during the legislative process, before
they become law.46
Third, the President must more extensively consider his role in a hypothetical dialogue with the Judiciary, which has the final say. If he believes
that a statute’s unconstitutionality is unavoidable, he examines the implications of (and for) judicial review. Key to this assessment is whether the
President believes that the Supreme Court would uphold the offending
provision. If he believes the Court would side with his assessment of
unconstitutionality, he should “weigh[] . . . the effect of compliance with
the provision on the constitutional rights of affected individuals and on the
executive branch’s constitutional authority,” as well as determine whether
his action or inaction “will permit judicial resolution of the issue.”47 This
inquiry also allows him to consider whether his course of action will
facilitate review by the Supreme Court.48
Dawn Johnsen has suggested a number of refinements to Dellinger’s
framework by focusing on particular criteria, two of which are relevant here:
(1) the clarity of the provision’s “constitutional infirmity,” and (2) the effect of
nonenforcement on the likelihood of judicial review.49 These factors are
consistent with Dellinger’s, but they add value because they shift the
emphasis of the inquiry from deference to the Judiciary to the institutional
competence of the Executive.
First, Johnsen contends, the President’s own views of the Constitution
should weigh more heavily where “the presidency, as an institution,
possesses special expertise,” as with political or military issues.50 In other
words, the President should not limit himself to a predictive analysis
regarding how the Court would resolve the issue, but rather should assert
his own expertise.
Second, she proposes, Presidents might actively seek judicial review.
Johnsen views ultimate judicial resolution of statutes as both better respecting the separation of powers and promoting “better constitutional
45
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 44 (2000).
50 Id. at 45; see also id. at 45-46, 52, 56.
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outcomes.”51 She cites Professor Eisgruber for the proposition that “insulated from electoral control, required to justify decisions by written opinion,
and selected partly on the basis of technical proficiency, judges have the
opportunity, the incentive, and the ability to interpret the Constitution
carefully.”52 In the equal protection context in particular, the likelihood that
the Court will enforce the asserted constitutional right depends in part on
whether it will apply rational basis or heightened scrutiny,53 since the
decision of which test to use is often outcome-determinative.54
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FRAMEWORK
IN THE NONDEFENSE CONTEXT
The decision not to defend a statute is distinct from the decision not to
enforce it. But largely because Dellinger constructed his framework for a
hypothetical nonenforcement decision, this Part examines some of the key
differences between the nonenforcement and the nondefense postures. For
instance, President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that a bill depriving
particular government appointees of their salary was unconstitutional as a
bill of attainder, but he nonetheless enforced it by failing to reappoint the
employees.55 His enforcement allowed the appointees to bring their action,
but the Court also took note of President Roosevelt’s choice not to defend
the bill56 in holding it unconstitutional.57 Because nonenforcement and nondefense are distinct and do not necessarily operate in tandem, when the
President confronts a decision of whether to defend a statute that he believes
violates equal protection principles, he must understand these differences.
51
52
53
54

Id. at 40.
Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 354-55.
Johnsen, supra note 49, at 48.
Id. (explaining that judicial review is a “far more effective” means of declaring a statute
unconstitutional when the Court employs a heightened scrutiny analysis rather than rational basis
review); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) (characterizing equal protection as “an underenforced
constitutional norm,” as reflected in state tax and economic regulations being “broad[ly]
exclu[ded]” from the reach of the Court’s interpretation of equal protection). For an example to
which Professor Sager points, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
In this challenge to public school funding disparities, “Texas virtually concede[d] that its
historically rooted dual system of financing education could not withstand . . . strict judicial
scrutiny.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). However, the Court applied the rational basis standard, since
poverty is not a suspect classification, and found that Texas had ample legitimate interests to
justify its school funding system—despite the resulting unequal expenditures in different districts.
Id. at 54-55.
55 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304-05 (1946).
56 Id. at 305 n.1.
57 Id. at 315.
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In brief, I conclude that the takeaways from the distinction between nonenforcement and nondefense must form part of the President’s inquiry. I
begin first by pointing out that the Dellinger/Johnsen framework is easily
adapted to the nondefense context. Then, I argue that some of the propositions from that framework actually apply with greater force in the nondefense
context and thus deserve greater elaboration here: First, nondefense is less
offensive to separation-of-powers principles, because it is more deferential to
both Congress and the Court. Second, the framework may apply better to
backward-looking (as opposed to forward-looking) decisions. Since nondefense supposes continued enforcement of the offending statute, nondefense
decisions are more likely to arise after an administration change (where the
previous administration had enforced and defended the statute, in addition,
very possibly, to signing it into law). When inheriting a statute he believes to
be unconstitutional, the President is more likely to refuse to defend than to
refuse to enforce it.58 It is only fitting, therefore, that the elaborated model
include, where applicable, backward-looking criteria exhorting the President
to consider, for instance, congressional motives59 and changed circumstances,
as opposed to solely how the statute will fare before the Court. Finally,
nondefense presents better prospects for securing judicial review, a crucial
component of the framework.
A. Applicability of the Dellinger/Johnsen Framework
to Nondefense Decisions
The Dellinger/Johnsen framework can be applied with only minor
changes to nondefense decisions. First, both nonenforcement and nondefense
scenarios share the same predicate: the President believes that a statute is
unconstitutional and must eventually be nullified. Nondefense is simply a
different mechanism for addressing the same conclusion. In both contexts,
58 This point is—to my knowledge, at least—theoretical, rather than empirical, and deserves
clarification. Theoretically, deciding not to enforce a statute is more controversial, and thus also
more aggressive, than deciding not to defend it. As a result, I suspect, the President may have to
expend more political capital to stop enforcing than to stop defending the same law; similarly, he
is more likely in the case of nonenforcement to jeopardize any reliance interests in the law’s
enforcement. In turn, these factors make a President more likely to refuse to enforce where he can
avoid compromising reliance interests and lessen his expenditure of political capital by announcing
before the passage of a law that he will refuse to enforce it. Consider, for example, President
Clinton’s nonenforcement decision regarding the HIV provision. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. In this theoretical structure, nonenforcement decisions thus would more likely be
forward-looking. By contrast nondefense decisions would be more likely to be backward-looking.
59 See Barron, supra note 40, at 80 (“Unlike the Court, the President need not necessarily
assess the wrongfulness of the legislative motive through such a deferential screen [as rational
basis].”).
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the Take Care and Oath Clauses presuppose the President’s same constitutional obligations to faithfully execute the laws of the United States.
Second, in both the nonenforcement and nondefense contexts, the President considers his relationship with Congress and the Judiciary. The
President’s Take Care and Oath obligations are the same in both contexts
with regard to correcting unconstitutional bills during the legislative
process: He has the same responsibility preventively to correct legislation
that he would consider refusing to enforce or defend if it were enacted.
Repeal, if viable, is equally compatible with nondefense.60 And if the
President determines that a statute is unavoidably unconstitutional,
Dellinger and Johnsen’s exhortations to consider judicial review make equal
sense: nondefense presupposes ongoing (or at least imminent) litigation.
The question thus becomes how any distinction between nondefense
decisions and nonenforcement decisions—a distinction not fleshed out by
the Dellinger/Johnsen framework—should matter to a President considering whether to defend a statute that appears to violate equal protection.
B. Separation-of-Powers Principles
Nondefense decisions better respect separation-of-powers principles
than do nonenforcement decisions, and this characteristic makes them
comport better than even nonenforcement decisions with the
Dellinger/Johnsen framework’s contemplated role for the President in
relation to Congress and the courts. Nondefense presents less of a concern
that the President will butt heads with Congress, because nondefense (a)
avoids executive lawmaking,61 (b) is symbolically more deferential by
60 For example, President Clinton announced that, were a provision which would prohibit
HIV-positive individuals from serving in the military not repealed, he would refuse to enforce it.
See Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban: A New
Threshold for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 597 (1997)
(recounting Clinton’s dilemma prior to the provision’s repeal, as well as his instruction to the DOJ
not to defend the law); see also Johnsen, supra note 49, at 54-58 (describing the circumstances and
primary factors that influenced Clinton’s nonenforcement decision).
61 Cf. Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal–Agent Problem, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1219-20 (2012) (explaining that “there is a difference between enforcing a law
and defending it,” because defending a law “will not affect its operation at all,” but rather only
“provide[] the court with [the Executive’s] understanding of what the Constitution requires”
(citing Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (“This claim
of right for the President to declare statutes unconstitutional and to declare his refusal to execute
them, as distinguished from his undisputed right to veto, criticize, or even refuse to defend in
court, statues which he regards as unconstitutional, is dubious at best.”))); Eugene Gressman, Take
Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986) (arguing that “when the President tries to do
more than he is permitted” by not faithfully enforcing a statute, “he becomes a lawmaker, a status
foreign to the constitutional division of power”).
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treating the statute as constitutional (as the President continues to enforce
the statute), and (c) permits Congress to appropriate funds to defend the
statute in court. Nondefense thus splits the difference: the President defers
to Congress by giving the statute effect through enforcement and by giving
Congress an opportunity to defend the law, but he also gives voice, particularly in court, to his own concerns about the act’s constitutionality. As I
discuss below, implementing this strategy allows a President concerned that
a statute violates equal protection principles to increase the likelihood that a
court, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will hear and resolve an issue of
significant societal and legal importance.
In continuing to enforce (but not defend) the offending act, the President also defers to the Judiciary, because nondefense often solicits the
Court’s judgment, whereas nonenforcement might prevent facial challenges
for lack of a case or controversy.62 Inasmuch as the President makes
nondefense a legal or moral matter, nondefense may encourage the Court to
take the case,63 and, having done so, to adopt the President’s argument.64
The high percentage of Supreme Court cases in which the government is
involved suggests as much.65

62 Another drawback to nonenforcement is that minorities affected by the law might fear a
decision by the same or a subsequent administration to enforce the statute, thereby forcing those
minorities to challenge the statute in a more hostile political regime and without the Executive’s
support. On the other hand, if the supportive Executive enforces the statute, he allows those
minorities to challenge it in court, and can make affirmative arguments against the statute’s
constitutionality in the ensuing litigation. See infra Section IV.C. Additionally, even while
presidential nonenforcement might temporarily nullify a federal statute, parallel state statutes
could extend the same discrimination unabated, without a Supreme Court holding that would also
abrogate the state discrimination. Litigants would then have to challenge the practice on a stateby-state basis until and unless the United States Supreme Court resolved the case.
63 “Jawboning, or moral suasion, . . . can . . . encourage the Court to take action.” KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 98 (2007).
64 See RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 8-9 (2012) (introducing a statistical study “point[ing] toward one
unmistakeable finding”: “the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] does not simply succeed
before the U.S. Supreme Court, it actually influences the Court throughout its decision-making
process”); id. at 72-91 (interrogating and discussing the OSG’s influence on merits outcomes and
concluding that “[w]hen compared to other attorneys with similar experience who enjoyed similar
backgrounds and contextual advantages, the OSG still was much more likely to win its cases”); id.
at 92-112 (discussing the influence of OSG briefs and noting that “the Court borrows more
[language] from OSG briefs because it trusts the professional judgment of the lawyers within that
office”); id. at 113-33 (discussing the influence of the OSG on legal doctrine); see also REBECCA MAE
SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 94-100 (1992) (explaining why the
Solicitor General has been called the “Tenth Justice” due to his influence before the Court).
65 See Office of the Solicitor General: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.
justice.gov/osg/about-osg.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (“The United States is involved in
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Similarly, nondefense might prompt the Court to consider a variety of
arguments, some of which could help it to reach the best decision. In some
cases, the DOJ might withdraw arguments it feels it cannot reasonably
support—and what the DOJ thinks is reasonable is likely influenced by
what the President, who can remove the Attorney General and Assistant
Attorneys General at will,66 thinks is reasonable. Given this pressure, the
Judiciary might receive a fuller range of arguments if Congress’s own
litigators are allowed to intervene (including, under rational basis review,
arguments based on post hoc rationality), rather than if the Court hears
only from an ambivalent DOJ. First, as Devins and Prakash argue, the law’s
proponents gain little when the President offers “a tepid defense” and
“might admit [the law’s] constitutional infirmities.”67 Second, nondefense
might encourage the Court to consider a diversity of congressional viewpoints, because not all members of Congress will see the statute the same
way.68 Ultimately, the statute will be defended; even if members of
Congress lack standing,69 the Court can, and will, appoint amici to carry out
the defense.70
So whereas the nonenforcement model exhorts the President to consider
what the Court would rule, nondefense in combination with enforcement asks
the Court actually to rule. By ultimately deferring to the Court, the President
neither usurps Congress’s authority, nor aggrandizes his own at the expense
of the former.71 In the equal protection context, striking this balance is
approximately two-thirds of all the cases the U.S. Supreme Court decides on the merits each
year.”).
66 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (explaining that “Congress cannot reserve
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment,” since the President has removal power over Executive officers); accord Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-86 (1988).
67 Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 572; see also Gorod, supra note 61, at 1239-41 (arguing
that in “cases in which the Executive Branch does not actually believe the law is constitutional,” its
“‘defense’ of a statute may actually undermine the interests of an adversarial system of justice
more than it promotes them”); Johnsen, supra note 49, at 49-50 (arguing that the President can
better serve the Court and promote inter-branch constitutional discourse by advancing “his actual
constitutional views” while Congress offers its own).
68 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 244, 249 (1992).
69 E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding that individual members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act).
70 See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 466 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme
Court occasionally appoints amicus curiae to argue a position that no party to the case
supports . . . .”). See generally Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici
Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011).
71 The Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence focuses on “encroachment and aggrandizement.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). “[S]tatutory provisions that to
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particularly important: while the Court often has a countermajoritarian role
to play,72 true change requires the cooperation of the political branches, which
can also help convince the Court to weigh in in the first place.
C. Forward- vs. Backward-Looking: The Need
to Consider Changed Circumstances
Much of Dellinger’s construct is forward-looking. Dellinger first points
to bills “under consideration by Congress,”73 thereby suggesting that the
President’s nonenforcement decision looks forward toward the enactment of
pending bills. He similarly adopts a forward-looking perspective when he
explains that the President should consider whether a provision “would violate
the Constitution”74 (as opposed to whether it violates the Constitution).75
some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment,” may be permissible. Id. (emphasis added). If anything, the nondefense
decision puts more power in the hands of the courts, which already have the power “to say what
the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Some have suggested that, from the perspective of constitutional law or political legitimacy,
continuing to enforce an indefensible act is problematic. E.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at
535 (“[T]he Constitution never bifurcates the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, generally requiring the Executive to enforce laws but authorizing him to decline to
defend them in some cases.”); Aziz Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) “Unconstitutional” Laws, 98
VA. L. REV. 1001, 1025-27 (2012) (arguing that the Obama administration should not have
uncoupled its decision to enforce the Defense of Marriage Act while not defending it); Aziz Huq,
Half-Empty: The Obama Administration’s New DOMA Position May Help a Handful of Gay Couples at
the Expense of All the Rest, SLATE (Feb. 28, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/02/halfempty.html (“Holder’s distinction between taking a
position in court and doing something in practice has an arbitrary feel.”). Yet there is still value in
the incremental approach of enforcing but not defending—an approach that allows the President
to respect the separation of powers while still presenting his own constitutional views.
72 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ( Jackson, J., concurring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that, in future cases, courts may need to consider the question “whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”).
73 See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 200.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 This forward-looking perspective is unsurprising given that the Dellinger Memorandum
initially grew out of conversations regarding hypothetical nonenforcement decisions among Abner
Mikva, then–White House Counsel; John (Jack) Quinn; then–Chief of Staff to the Vice
President; and Walter Dellinger, who at the time was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel. Dellinger’s draft memo, and later OLC opinion, became all the
more timely when the provision barring HIV-positive individuals from military service came
across President Clinton’s desk. Conversation with Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny &
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But the Dellinger/Johnsen framework applies better still to nondefense
decisions because of their often–backward-looking nature. A President
assessing whether a statute violates equal protection will likely have
inherited that statute, and that question, from a prior administration. Any
nondefense decision regarding the statute will necessarily be backwardlooking, especially because the President will likely continue to enforce the
offending statute,76 which the previous administration had probably already
enforced.77
Backward-looking nondefense decisions demand attention to intervening changes in both society and the law since the provision’s enactment, and
therefore suggest that the President should expressly consider a “changed
circumstances” factor. This criterion would allow the President to assess
whether society, his understanding thereof, or the law have changed in ways
material to his projections for—and prospective influence on—a future
Court decision. Specifically, it would help him reflect on whether similar
developments clarify what could not have been seen before: that the law is
unconstitutional.78 Changed-circumstances analysis asserts, among other
things, that Congress’s institutional competence as a prospective factfinder
and lawmaker has reached a breaking point. Congress, perhaps gridlocked,
cannot as easily account for and review the mismatch of its predictive
efforts and reality; the Court and the President, as post-enactment actors,
are better equipped to administer the requisite retrospection. In essence, a
nondefense stance will ultimately ask the Court to consider changed
circumstances.

Myers LLP (July 13, 2012); see also Johnsen, supra note 49, at 54-58 (discussing President Clinton’s
stance on the provision). Dellinger eventually advised President Clinton not to defend the statute,
but Clinton nevertheless signed the offending statute into law (as part of the 1996 Defense
Authorization bill). Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, & Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Briefing, (Feb. 9, 1996), available at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/02/1996-02-09-quinn-and-dellinger-briefing-on-hiv-provision.html.
76 E.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 n.1 (1946) (explaining that, although
President Roosevelt believed the bill depriving the plaintiffs of their salary was unconstitutional,
he nevertheless enforced it by not reappointing the plaintiffs).
77 See also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
78 E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion) (noting the
momentous social and legal changes with regard to gender and quoting Justice Bradley’s infamous
concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring), in which he
wrote that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfil [sic] the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother”); see also infra notes 150-155 and accompanying text (discussing
Frontiero and the failed attempt to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment).
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D. The Heightened Need for Judicial Review,
and How Nondefense Facilitates It
If the President truly believes that a statute violates equal protection, he
will want the Court to endorse his position. Nondefense facilitates striking
the repellent statute from the books, as it presents better prospects for
judicial review than does nonenforcement. By enforcing but not defending a
statute, the President suggests that the statute’s constitutional infirmity is
not clear, or, alternatively, that he either lacks political support for nonenforcement or wants to assume a deferential separation-of-powers stance.
As discussed in Section II.B, nondefense is less threatening than nonenforcement, both because it is less assertive79 and because it still allows
Congress to defend the constitutionality of the offending act in litigation.80
When the President has serious doubts regarding a statute’s constitutionality,
Congress may even be a more spirited advocate.81 Further, nondefense is
also less threatening to separation-of-powers principles because it allows the
Court to affirm the statute’s constitutionality.82
Moreover, nondefense could embolden plaintiffs to bring test cases,83
which would provide reviewing courts with a more expansive factual
record.84 Further, DOJ advisory opinions85 and briefs can provide courts
79 Nondefense is often a lesser-included element of most nonenforcement decisions. See
Gussis, supra note 60, at 605 n.67 (“There are no instances where Presidents have not enforced,
yet have defended, legislation.”).
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(b)(2) (2006) (contemplating congressional intervention by requiring
the DOJ to notify the House and Senate “within such time as will reasonably enable” them “to
intervene in timely fashion in the proceeding”); Johnsen, supra note 49, at 50 (explaining that, in
cases of nondefense, “Congress remains free, through other attorneys, to present its defense of the
statute in the litigation”).
81 See supra notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text.
82 At least, DOMA’s intervening defenders appear to think so: “There are currently seven
other DOMA cases pending in district courts around the country in six different circuits. . . . This
proliferation of cases is a product of the Department’s incoherent decision to implement-but-notdefend DOMA.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. v. Gill,
No. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012).
83 For instance, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of an FCC policy of “awarding
preferences to minority owners in comparative licensing proceedings,” Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 558 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
over the DOJ’s argument that the law was unconstitutional, see Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26-27, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (No. 89-453).
84 Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953-91 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (presenting
extensive findings of fact to assess whether California’s Proposition 8, which bans same-sex
marriage, violated the Equal Protection Clause), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012).
85 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103
MICH. L. REV. 676, 745 (2005) (observing that the Executive Branch, unlike the judiciary, can
issue helpful advisory opinions “in advance of any concrete controversy”).
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with guidance based on the strength of their reasoning and their “power to
persuade.”86 An advisory opinion may be particularly able to persuade the
Court because the DOJ can draw on and synthesize the myriad administrative perspectives regarding the unconstitutionality of the act as applied.87
In sum, continuing to enforce the law without defending it helps trigger
judicial review88 and, just as importantly, gives Congress the opportunity to
reconsider the law (and thus its possible repeal) by forcing it to justify the
provision in the ensuing litigation.89 Overall, executive nondefense decisions can have the salutary effect of fostering productive constitutional
dialogue among all three branches of government.90 The Court then has
more angles from which to view the issue. As in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, the Court might disagree with the DOJ that the statute is unconstitutional, and uphold it.91 On the other hand, this spirited dialogue may
eventually persuade the Court to rule otherwise—as when it overruled
Metro Broadcasting only five years later.92
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR HEIGHTENED AUTHORITY
IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CONTEXT
I am concerned in particular in this Comment with the President who
faces the difficult decision of whether to defend a statute he believes
violates equal protection. The President’s authority not to defend constitutionally objectionable statutes is not uniform across all areas of constitutional
law.93 While I have argued above that the Dellinger/Johnsen framework can
86 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing how courts should analyze
the rulings and interpretations of administrative agencies in certain circumstances).
87 Cf. Theodore C. Hirt, Current Issues Involving the Defense of Congressional and Administrative
Agency Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1377, 1378-84 (2000) (explaining the centralization of
litigation authority in the Federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the DOJ and
describing how the Branch develops expertise in considering a wide variety of agency programs).
88 See Rao, supra note 21, at 548 (“Execution of the laws usually generates public awareness of
the President’s actions and triggers the possibility of political and judicial review.”).
89 See, e.g., supra note 60 (discussing President Clinton’s exertion of pressure on Congress to
repeal the military HIV ban).
90 See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Obama Administration Asks Court to Lift Ban on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell,’ Again, POLITICO (July 14, 2011), http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0711/Obama_
administration_asks_court_to_lift_ban_on_dont_ask_dont_tell.html (describing the back-andforth between the Ninth Circuit and the administration).
91 See supra note 82.
92 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995), overruling Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 558 (1990).
93 Historically, the Court has tended to defer to the President on certain matters, including
national security, POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 30; see also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944) (holding, despite employing strict scrutiny, that Congress and the
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be adapted to the nondefense context, in this Part I turn to my argument
that the equal protection context is one of the more compelling areas for
presidential assertion of the prerogative not to defend a statute. I assert that
the President’s authority to make the nondefense decision is heightened in
the equal protection arena.
This authority—or responsibility—is especially compelling where the
President determines that Congress’s classification should receive more than
just rational basis scrutiny.94 First, I begin by incorporating equal protection
scholarship to argue that the President has the duty to ensure the protection
of underenforced rights. I then assert that he thus also has the responsibility
to alert the Court, through nondefense, where circumstances warrant
heightened scrutiny. Finally, after establishing this responsibility, I offer a
new model for nondefense where the President believes that a statute
should be evaluated under heightened scrutiny pursuant to the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.
The President has his own institutional competencies, so I do not contend that the standard he applies should be the same as that which a court
reviewing the statute would apply. Instead, based on the factors discussed in
this Part, I contend that the relatively open texture of Dellinger’s nondefense
Court had to defer to the judgment of “the properly constituted military authorities”), immigration and naturalization, see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (noting that with regard to
immigration and naturalization, “[t]he obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled
the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into this field”), formal sovereignty and territorial
governance, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (noting that certain matters, such as
“formal sovereignty and territorial governance . . . are best left to the political branches”), and
“political questions,” see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he basic question presented . . . in this case is ‘political’ and
therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our
country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to
negate the action of the President.”).
This deference seems to be at its height when separation-of-powers concerns are themselves
at stake—an acknowledgement the President must be given some room to protect his prerogatives.
See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 15, at 201; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the existence of the President’s
authority to, at times, act contrary to a statutory command). The Justices implicitly agree that the
President must be allowed to defend his vision of his own powers in court. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (“The Framers regarded the checks and balances . . . built into
the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”). Further, in INS v. Chadha, the
Solicitor General, far from defending the statute in question, attacked its constitutionality as
“encroach[ing] upon the powers of the Executive in administering the Immigration and
Nationality Act.” Brief for Appellant-Respondent, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 801832, 80-2170, 80-2171), 1982 WL 607268, at *6.
94 Cf. Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 356 (“Interpretive deference is more common in cases
where structural, rather than rights-based, issues predominate.”).
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decisionmaking model should be elaborated with greater precision for equal
protection nondefense decisions. The refinements I offer help both to
contextualize the exceptional nature of the nondefense decision (and thus
serve as a limiting principle for future Presidents who might seek to
aggrandize their office through selective enforcement or defense of statutes)
and to emphasize the importance of the distinction between nonenforcement
and nondefense in the equal protection context.
A. The Case for Greater Authority Where Equal Protection
Demands Heightened Scrutiny
Where the President believes a statute is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, and specifically where he believes the standard of review
should not be rational basis, but rather a heightened form of scrutiny, he has
increased nondefense authority and should engage in his own version of
searching review before making the final decision of whether to defend the
law. In this Section, I argue why we should have a new framework for
presidential nondefense authority in such situations. I do not address other
areas where one might argue that important rights are at stake—for
example, the First Amendment and fundamental rights (including those
protected by substantive due process). Rather, I contend that denial of
equal protection is, as the Court first alluded to in its famous footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., a special case,95 fraught more than any
other with the danger of majoritarian tyranny.96
If the Court is underenforcing a constitutional mandate such as equal
protection (ostensibly for separation-of-powers and institutional competency
reasons97), and Congress has already taken a position the President deems
unconstitutional, then the President must take a less deferential stance than
the posture he usually assumes. The Court’s three-tiered review system
should further inform his inquiry, but not constrain it.98 The President has
an enhanced responsibility to (1) ensure protection of the underenforced
right, and (2) alert the Court through nondefense that he believes that
conditions warrant a stricter standard of review. The first proposition is an
95
96

See 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
See generally LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1995).
97 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 692 (arguing that when courts use rational basis review, they
“leave it to the political branches to fill the enforcement gap”).
98 See Barron, supra note 40, at 77-78 (“[T]he President’s substantive constitutional judgment
in this instance most likely was not the result of a prediction about how the Court would rule if
the case were put before it. . . . [T]he Court would have been likely to have upheld Section 567 in
the face of a private challenge to it.”).
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extension, based on the Take Care Clause, of the Carolene Products principle: in a representative democracy, minorities risk unfair—and oftentimes
unconstitutional—deprivation of rights enjoyed by the majority. And the
second relies, to an extent, on the President’s special institutional competence in his ability to litigate and influence the Court, as well as to assuage
the Court’s structural concerns regarding deference to the other branches.
In an equal protection underenforcement situation, the President is not
using his powers for self-aggrandizement: rather than seeking to usurp
interpretive authority from the Court, the President is asking the Court to
check the political branches more vigorously. Nor is he seeking to usurp
Congress’s authority: the very question is not simply whether the Court
would agree with the Executive, but whether Congress itself deserves
deference, and if not, whether the Executive can (and should) help induce
the Court to apply heightened scrutiny. This series of questions further
helps to constrain nondefense decisions to higher-stakes contexts and
thereby maintain the balance of power among the branches of government.
1. The President’s Enhanced Responsibility to Ensure
the Protection of Underenforced Rights
The President has an enhanced responsibility to ensure protection of
underenforced constitutional rights and mandates.99 I begin with Larry
Sager’s contention that the history of civil rights in the United States
empirically demonstrates that the Court—and, perhaps, the entirety of the
federal government—sometimes underenforces important rights later
recognized under the Constitution.100 I then assert that when the Court fails
to enforce constitutional rights, the logical conclusion is that the onus falls
on the President to do so.

99 See Sortirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution Outside the
Courts, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 267, 267 (2000) (asserting that the Constitution “imposes higher
obligations upon legislatures, executives, and citizens generally to pursue constitutional ends or to
secure constitutional rights”).
100 See generally Sager, supra note 54; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on
the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410 (1993); see also generally ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 504-05, 586-87 (2002) (recounting
Senator Charles Sumner’s “repudiat[ion of] the legitimacy of separate but equal facilities” as early
as 1870, but the failure of his corresponding bill to pass, and noting the flagging “support for the
idea of federal intervention to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” in the South
beginning around 1877).
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a. The Court’s Underenforcement of the Constitution
While the Court has not recognized a Carolene Products role for the President, it has recognized that the political branches are tasked with ensuring the
vitality of a number of (potentially) otherwise underenforced constitutional
rights. What is less clear is whether the Constitution substantively extends
these rights—arguably it does not—or whether the Court simply recognizes
that, because of the separation of powers, it is not the appropriate institution to flesh out those guarantees.101 Either way, though, this recognition
lends support to the notion that the President likewise has a responsibility
to ensure constitutional execution of the laws.
Because the Court’s recognition of the role of Congress and the Executive comes in the form of deference—and thus the risk of its own
underenforcement where the political branches fail to act—this tension
between democratic lawmaking and majoritarian tyranny inheres in our
democracy.102 Yet, as the following discussion of procedural due process and
equal protection cases will show, the Court has continually reexamined where
it draws the line between aspirational constitutional rights, the extension of
which it entrusts to the political branches, and judicially enforceable
constitutional rights, which individual plaintiffs can seek to vindicate. This
constant boundary-line redrawing renders the territories on either side “up
for grabs,” and suggests that the President might declare some zones more
properly within the judicial domain as the meaning of equal protection shifts.
The Court has explicitly recognized, in the deference it has shown to
Congress and state legislatures in procedural due process cases in the
administrative law context, and in equal protection cases concerning welfare
and poverty, that when its standard of review is rational basis, the responsibility for protecting certain classes of individuals falls on the elected
101 For example, Neal Katyal explains that one position “with regard to judicial supremacy” is
that “[t]he Court has the responsibility to interpret the Constitution, but the question of what
remedies are appropriate to rectify a constitutional violation is left to the legislature. The Court
retains jurisdiction to review the remedy if it does not satisfy constitutional concerns.” Neal
Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1359-60 (2001). This
position can be explained by Larry Sager’s underenforcement work. Id. at 1370 (citing Sager, supra
note 54, at 1213-15). Courts often evince this approach when they “fear imposing remedies due to
their lack of expertise and their lack of political accountability, which can lead them to water down
the substantive right to sidestep the remedy question altogether.” Id. at 1370.
102 See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 659 (E.D. La. 1961) (“One
of the purposes of the Constitution of the United States was to protect minorities from the
occasional tyranny of the majorities.”), aff’d, 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373,
388-89 (2007) (explaining that courts “limit[] majoritarian decisionmaking . . . whenever they
vindicate any constitutional right”).
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branches.103 The responsibility of the elected branches to act is the corollary
of the Court’s underenforcement; it is the result of the Court’s explicit
deference to Congress and state legislatures under rational basis scrutiny.
In 1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court determined that New York welfare recipients had procedural due process rights to a hearing before losing
their benefits.104 That same year, though, in Dandridge v. Williams, the
Court held that a Maryland regulation setting a maximum cap on welfare
eligibility did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the rational
basis standard, because the state had a legitimate interest in “provid[ing] an
incentive to seek gainful employment” by setting “a limit on the recipient’s
grant.”105 The Court analyzed the regulation under the rational basis
standard, despite its observation that “[t]he administration of public welfare
assistance . . . involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings.”106 The decision of state officials deserved great deference—
it was not to be “second-guess[ed].”107
Yet by 1976, the Court had cut back on Goldberg’s protections by holding, in Mathews v. Eldridge, that a disability-entitlement plaintiff had no
procedural due process rights to a predeprivation hearing.108 The Court
explained that, “[i]n assessing what process is due in this case, substantial
weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that
the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals.”109 That same year, in Washington v. Davis, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause could not support claims of

103 Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (noting that the death penalty—and the
limits thereon—falls largely to the legislatures, which are “constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the people” (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Here, the Court concedes
that there are fundamental rights at stake, but essentially argues that the political branches are
better positioned to flesh them out. See Pillard, supra note 85, at 694 (arguing that the political
branches seem to have been given the responsibility to ensure quality of legal counsel or fair
application of the death penalty).
104 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). In dissent, Justice Black’s dissent condemned the Court’s
decision as “wander[ing] out of [its] field of vested powers and transgress[ing] into the area
constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people.” Id. at 274 (Black, J., dissenting).
105 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
106 Id. at 485; see also id. (“We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the
cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.”).
107 Id. at 487.
108 See 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that procedural due process rights are to be assessed
through a balancing test that includes taking into account the government’s interest in avoiding
fiscal burdens).
109 Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
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disproportionate impact based on race.110 And in 1985, in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, the Court retrenched yet again by further reducing
the amount of process required before a government employer may discharge
an employee with a property right in continued employment.111 While similar
analogues exist, for example, in the Court’s (and lower courts’) shifting
willingness to imply a Bivens cause of action112 and in the First Amendment
context,113 the bottom line is that the elected branches often get just what they
want—great latitude due to the Court’s deference.114
b. The Onus Falls on the President: A Carolene Products Perspective
Given a Congress determined to legislate unconstitutionally, the President’s responsibility is not dissimilar to the responsibility that the Court
recognized for itself in Carolene Products. In Carolene Products, the Court
reasoned that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”115
While the Carolene Products footnote imagines the Court as the branch bestpositioned to safeguard the rights of minorities, the footnote’s primary
premise is also applicable to a President who recognizes the unconstitutionality

110 See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing
alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.”) (internal citations omitted).
111 See 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985) (“[A]ll the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided
by the Ohio statute.”).
112 For the case that implied a cause of action directly under the Constitution (specifically,
the Fourth Amendment), see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). For a discussion of the shifting Bivens standards, see, for example, Carlos
M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens
Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2013).
113 See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2000) (observing that the Court focused its
energies on economic liberties rather than speech liberties before developing the modern
understanding of the First Amendment). Schiller argues that the Court underenforced the First
Amendment during the first decades of the twentieth century, and only began to offer greater
protection for free speech as lower courts began “to lose faith in the ability of legislators [and
administrators] to regulate speech.” Id. at 3.
114 See also, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 35, 208 (discussing the limp protections extended in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004), in which the Court found that a
basic military tribunal could satisfy due process concerns).
115 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938).
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of a statute, even if what motivates him to assess that unconstitutionality is
his policy or his constituency.116 That idea is that constitutional values—
and, in particular, equal protection—are constraints with which we bind our
own future democratic decisionmaking because we are concerned about our
incapacity to restrain our prejudices and look out for those least wellrepresented—i.e., the tyranny of the majority.117 We are concerned about a
116 Cf. Gorod, supra note 61, at 1231-35 (arguing that “the Executive Branch is, of course, full
of such appointees intended to ensure that the Executive Branch’s policymaking is reflective of the
political and philosophical views of the President who heads it”); id. at 1236-37 (observing that “it
is not surprising” that the Executive should have its own legal views, and that it can “present those
views to the courts.”).
117 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) (“Some classifications are more likely
than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible
with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled
to equal justice under the law.”); see also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (laying out
the four factors for determining whether a particular group should receive heightened scrutiny
(quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986))). Justice Thurgood Marshall explored the
relationship between equal protection and the constitutional concern with majoritarian tyranny in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, in which he observed that “[p]rejudice, once let loose, is
not easily cabined . . . In light of the importance of the interest at stake and the history of
discrimination the retarded have suffered, the Equal Protection Clause requires us” to apply
heightened scrutiny. 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall’s Constitution is highly aware of, and responsive to,
society’s inability to cope fairly with the rights that the majority may seek to strip from
minorities; he is concerned with how prejudices are perpetrated through the polity:

The political powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait
are relevant insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group’s interests and
needs. . . .
The discreteness and insularity warranting a “more searching judicial inquiry,”
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938), must therefore
be viewed from a social and cultural perspective as well as a political one. To this
task judges are well suited, for the lessons of history and experience are surely the
best guide as to when, and with respect to what interests, society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging to the
community. Because prejudice spawns prejudice, and stereotypes produce limitations that confirm the stereo[]type on which they are based, a history of unequal
treatment requires sensitivity to the prospect that its vestiges endure. In separating
those groups that are discrete and insular from those that are not, as in many important legal distinctions, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York
Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472-73 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Compare id., with 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1602, at 417-18 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed.
1891) (“[From] that fundamental principle of republican government . . . it is not to be inferred . . . that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to
lay hold of a majority of their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing
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particularly severe case of underenforcement, and disturbed, perhaps, that
there is something more sinister about a discriminatory denial of rights than
a universal denial of rights. This intuitive sense of “Kant’s categorical
imperative” in this context “describes an ideal to which every constitutional
authority should aspire.”118
The Carolene Products postulate holds no less true where that tyranny has
shaped the status quo. For decades, equal protection has involved notions of
legal change and the recognition that, in the past, the Court has not always
enforced constitutional rights to equality to the appropriate degree.119
Indeed, one of the core notions of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is that changed circumstances will uncover historically enduring,
judicially permitted inequities.120 The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education recognized as much.121 As Justice Breyer has written, “by 1954 it
had become clear that racial segregation . . . had denied minority groups the
very equality that the [Equal Protection C]lause sought to assure them.”122
Deciding Brown depended on “applying not particular historical beliefs but
the values that underlie” the Equal Protection Clause.123 Just before stating
its conclusion—“that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place [because s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal”124—the Brown Court looked to “the extent of psycho-

Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the
courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they
had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.”).
118 Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and
Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 330 (2002) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000)).
119 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (tracing the changing notions of, and case law regarding, race
and civil rights throughout the Cold War).
120 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“[T]he Equal
Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. . . . [W]e have never
been confined to historic notions of equality . . . . Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.”).
121 See 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.” (footnote omitted)).
122 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 78 (2010).
123 Id.; see also id. at 150 (“[T]he Court, the legal community, and much of American society
had begun to see the Plessy decision as legally wrong and the segregated society it helped build as
morally wrong[—a wrong that] had worked incalculable harm.”).
124 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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logical knowledge”125 and how it had developed from the state of social
science at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,126 decided half a century earlier.127
Less well known, though, is the historical role that the President has
played in the evolution of equal protection doctrine.128 If we accept Larry
Sager’s argument that there is space between constitutional case law and the
Constitution itself,129 then if the Court is underenforcing a right, another
branch must attend to that space. And in the past, Presidents have done so.
That the President, as a normative matter, should take an active hand in
navigating these waters flows logically from the confluence of three primary
factors. First, the underlying values—equal protection of minorities at the
mercy of majoritarian tyranny, as recognized in Carolene Products—demand
scrutiny of the majority’s motivations. But underlying Carolene Products and
equal protection jurisprudence lies a compromise between determining what
the Constitution might actually mean and deferring to Congress out of
separation-of-powers concerns. The Court’s three-tiered equal protection
framework, built upon this compromise, therefore wavers due to internal
instability. Rules for intermediate scrutiny, for instance, “are at once
deferential and overprotective.”130 That is, these rules can be both under- and
overinclusive, as when they do not sufficiently scrutinize “‘actual’ legislative
motivation,” at the one end, and when, at the other, they hold legislative
motives “impermissible on the basis of doctrinal tests that are intended to
evaluate motive without engaging in the kind of searching inquiry that
might reveal the motive[s] to have been pure.”131
This compromise is evident in both the heightened and strict scrutiny
constructions: the point is not that that the government can never distinguish or “classif[y] on the basis of certain characteristics, including race,
national origin, illegitimacy, and gender,”132 but that “[t]hese factors are
125
126
127
128

Id. at 494.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
See, e.g., DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 25-26 (discussing President Harry Truman’s consideration of African American voters in developing his pro–civil rights stance).
129 See Sager, supra note 100, at 414 (pointing out that some “claims of justice” under the
Constitution will not be upheld by the courts, but rather must be “affirmed by the institutions of
popular government: Congress, the President, or their legislative or Executive counterparts in
state and local governments” and describing this phenomenon as “a gap between the reach of
constitutional case law and the reach of justice”).
130 Barron, supra note 40, at 71.
131 Id.
132 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-15, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Massachusetts, No. 12-15 ( July 3, 2012) available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/08/12-15-Mass-Gill-Petition-final.pdf [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Massachusetts
Certiorari Petition].
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so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that
laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others.”133 In some ways, this tension is a natural consequence
of the fact that the Equal Protection Clause means that “all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike”134 and the “practical necessity that most
legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage
to various groups or persons.”135 But the point is that while the Court’s test
will not always be able to smoke out impermissible motivations, asking
whether Congress had impermissible motivations is the right approach.
Second, Congress, in the nondefense context, has by definition removed
itself as a source of constitutional protection. That the President has not
similarly removed himself does nothing to lessen the Carolene Products
rationale that the “political processes” are unsuited to the task of protecting
minorities. As the Court explained in Cleburne, strict scrutiny also relies on
the fact that “such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means.”136 In fact, the Take Care Clause, even in its weakest form,
supports the notion that the President may have to be proactive in response
to the deference that the Court might otherwise show to Congress. And
third, separation-of-powers principles remain: one need not be a strong
departmentalist to recognize judicial supremacy—that the Court gets the
final say—while also recognizing the influence of persuasive advocacy to
help the Court understand changed circumstances and their relevance.137
These last two points are delicately intertwined: the Court both defers—
thereby possibly permitting Congress to violate the Constitution—as well
as looks to popular and executive constitutionalism to help it interpret the
Constitution’s shifting meaning—thereby providing an opportunity for
presidential advocacy.138 Where changed societal circumstances suggest that
133
134
135
136
137

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Id. at 439.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added).
Cf. Gorod, supra note 61, at 1254 (“It would seem far better in some circumstances to
recognize that the Executive Branch cannot always act for the whole and to allow many parties to
offer their competing visions of what the Constitution allows and to let the courts make the final
determination.”).
138 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 21, at 150 (explaining that the Court’s decision in Romer is
“more interesting” because it “supported the gay rights position” than for its “legal analysis,”
because the Court, no doubt aware of “high levels of support for the proposition that employers
should not discriminate against gays and lesbians . . . was predicting the future”); see also Barry
Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602 (2003) (“But what
those who complain about judicial review often miss is that consistent with the concept of popular
constitutionalism, the judicial veto necessarily must fall within a range acceptable to popular
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rational basis is no longer the appropriate test, the burden falls on the
political branches to act accordingly.139 With Congress out of the equation,
and the President unable to legislate (and unwilling not to enforce, given
the resulting failure to create a justiciable controversy and the eventual
election of another President), nondefense becomes the best choice.
2. The President’s Responsibility to Alert the Court
When Conditions Warrant Heightened Scrutiny
The assertion that the President has responsibility to take action where
Congress and the Court have failed might appear, at first, to raise separationsof-powers concerns. Remember, however, that the action under consideration is not whether the President effectuates Congress’s intent (at issue in
nonenforcement decisions), but instead how the President directs the course
of litigation (an executive branch responsibility).140 This question arises
when the President disagrees with what Congress—not the Court—says the
Constitution means with regard to a statute: Congress has asserted one
understanding, the President disagrees, and the Court has not yet addressed
the question. Through nondefense, the Executive is the branch most
responsible for, and competent at, advancing arguments against the statute’s
constitutionality.141 Although better at retrospection, the Court has a
particular blind spot in its rational basis standard,142 which is too deferential
judgment over time . . . .”); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (finding empirically that the Court’s 1956–1981 “decisions not only
have conformed closely to the aggregate policy opinions of the American public but have thereby
reinforced and helped legitimate emergent majoritarian concerns”); Post & Siegel, supra note 102,
at 384 (noting that while “[t]he very practices that ensure the democratic accountability of the
American constitutional system thus seem also to endanger the integrity of American constitutional law,” the Court nonetheless seems to “accomplish[] this remarkable feat” of “incorporating
popular beliefs into the domain of legality”).
139 Cf., e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 517-18 (2005) (“In the American
constitutional machine, which does not quite ‘run of itself,’ courts have long been viewed as rightsprotecting, institutional brakes, while Executive departments and administrative agencies are
institutional accelerators.”).
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and
securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction
of the Attorney General.”).
141 For a discussion of whom the executive branch serves—i.e., who is the principal and who
is the agent: Congress, the President, or the People?—see generally Gorod, supra note 61, at 1228-35.
142 See supra notes 54 & 100; see also Richard H. Fallon, The Supreme Court 1996 Term—
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 64 (1997) (“[T]he Court does not
always frame constitutional doctrine to ensure that constitutional values are protected to the
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to a Congress that is now testing the very limits of this deference through
the objectionable statute. Here, the Court’s standard has failed to keep pace
with society’s understandings of equality, and the concern is that the Court
is unlikely to raise the question sua sponte of whether it should adopt
stricter scrutiny towards the statute143—scrutiny necessary to reach the
correct outcome—if the President does not intervene.144
The President has institutional competence that the Court lacks in the
form of prospective factfinding capabilities.145 Unlike a court, the President is
not bound to consider only those matters that the parties have brought before
him or those which are properly susceptible of judicial notice.146 Rather,
where the Court has historically deferred to the elected legislature and where
the legislature has not only failed to act, but has taken arguably discriminatory action, the President’s own assessment may reveal the injustice. In such
circumstances, the President has the responsibility to take action on behalf

fullest possible extent. . . . [S]ome constitutional tests reflect an implicit judgment that it would be
too costly or unworkable in practice for courts to enforce all constitutional norms to their full
conceptual limits.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative
Democracy, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1442 (2004) (“Certain constitutional norms . . . may be
judicially underenforced because of the institutional limits of courts, and left to the political
processes for fuller enforcement.”). See generally Lawrence Sager, Material Rights, Underenforcement,
and the Adjudication Thesis, 90 B.U. L. REV. 579 (2010) (defending the underenforcement theory).
143 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 695 (discussing the importance of political branch action
where the Court’s standard is deferential); Sager, supra note 100, at 419 (arguing that the gap
between constitutional case law and the Constitution provides a strong reason “for valuing popular
participation in the definition and implementation of justice”).
144 As I describe below, the Solicitor General is able to exert an influence that private parties
cannot. See infra subsection III.A.2.b.
145 On comparative institutional competence, see Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 352 (“Interpretive authority belongs to the most competent branch (or branches). . . . It directs each branch to
justify deference (or the lack of it) by first identifying the purposes served by the Constitution
and then making a judgment about which institutions are best equipped to pursue that purpose.”).
On factfinding, see infra note 146 and accompanying text.
146 Surely, courts do engage in their own factfinding, so they may not be limited even where
the Executive does not exercise this institutional competence. See generally Brianne J. Gorod, The
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-37 (2011) (collecting
examples of appellate courts looking outside the developed record on appeal “to point out the
extent to which [courts rely] on extra-record facts in reaching their conclusion”); see also Michael
Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
965, 971-72 (2009) (arguing that court decisions based on extra-record factfinding are “driven by
evidence that the parties never explained and the meaning or importance of which they never
contested”). But such factfinding may be neither uniform nor fair; rather, it is ad hoc and opaque,
and so it may be adverse to both parties, as well as to the general public, which is bound by the
resulting rule. See, e.g., Gorod, supra, at 9 (“Given this indeterminacy, it is problematic when such
‘facts’ are ‘found’ by ad hoc methods without the benefit of rigorous testing and then provide the
basis for consequential legal decisions.”).
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of those denied equal protection of the laws, as he serves as the only official
in our federal political system elected by a national constituency.
Four factors militate in favor of increased Executive authority in the
equal protection domain. Historically, (1) the political branches have been
influential in the Court’s decisionmaking process; the deference that the
Court shows the elected branches not only suggests that the President’s
involvement will help to shape the doctrine, but also that his involvement is
entirely appropriate and may be necessary to help counterbalance the
deference the Court might otherwise be inclined to show to Congress.
Moreover, (2) the Executive has demonstrated its efficacy in shaping equal
protection outcomes and, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is
perhaps the single most influential litigant. Further, as an Executive representing all the nation’s people,147 the President is more responsive to shifts
in opinion, mood, and circumstances, and can thus (3) bring democratic
legitimacy to litigation and (4) reinforce the legitimacy of judicial resolution
through political accountability and influence outside of court.148 The
argument for increased Executive authority in the equal protection context
is fairly straightforward: Historically, the Executive has been effective in
influencing the Court, the branch self-charged with protecting minority
rights against the very majoritarian tyranny149 evinced by Congress’s
decision to pass a statute that the President believes violates equal protection principles. The President’s litigators may be able to help the Court see
that it again needs to exercise that countermajoritarian muscle.

147 The Court has recognized the importance of the “national” perspective in the legislative
process. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) (“[I]t may be, at some times, on some
subjects, that the President elected by all the people, is rather more representative of them all than
are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not
countrywide . . . .” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
148 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is . . . .”); WHITTINGTON,
supra note 63, at 21 (observing that the President, as a nationally-elected officer must be cognizant
of maintaining a legislative coalition and thus “cannot be idiosyncratic in defining his agenda”).
149 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other
citizens. . . . Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time
must be prevented, or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by
their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”).
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a. Historical Influence of the Elected Branches on Litigation
The elected branches can claim significant influence over the Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. The
extension of heightened scrutiny to sex as a protected class is a perfect example
of the Court’s deference to Congress in heightening its standard of review. In
Frontiero v. Richardson, the plurality looked to congressional interpretations
of the Equal Protection Clause under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Equal Pay Act, and, finally, the passed (but unratified) Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), as significant interpretations of a “coequal
branch.”150 Further, the plurality failed to secure the one additional vote it
needed for a majority because Justice Powell preferred to defer to Congress
and the People by waiting for the ERA’s ratification.151 Thus, while the
ERA itself was never ratified by a sufficient number of states, the Court’s
subsequent jurisprudence resulted in a “de facto” ERA, with substantially
the same provisions.152
Both the plurality’s failure to secure an extra vote as well as the resulting
“de facto” ERA evince the importance of elected-branch signaling in
litigation. Justice Powell’s refusal to join the majority demonstrates that
Justices are concerned with legislative and popular interpretations of the
Constitution; at the same time, the “de facto” ERA shows that “[t]he social
changes that did not quite produce the Equal Rights Amendment” nonetheless moved the Court to “produce[] a de facto ERA in the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence.”153 Proponents of the ERA had openly argued
that influencing the Supreme Court was one of the objectives of the
amendment process.154 Their advocacy ultimately traced back to
150 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“Congress itself
has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a
coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration.”
(emphasis added)).
151 See id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the ERA provides a
“compelling reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test of judicial scrutiny” and arguing that the Court’s “reaching out to pre-empt by
judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes” (internal punctuation omitted)).
152 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1368 (2006) (observing that the
change “began in the executive branch, . . . spread to Congress, and then finally to the Courts”
(emphasis added)).
153 Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 984-85 (2002); see also
Siegel, supra note 152, at 1332-39 (observing that, even though the Equal Rights Amendment was
not ratified, many have seen it as successful because the Court has essentially adopted the standard
it contained in cases whose “precepts . . . are now canonical”).
154 See Siegel, supra note 152, at 1368.
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“[c]hange . . . in the executive branch, led by women convened by President
Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women.”155
Another analogue is the Court’s recognition of the repeal of state
sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas.156 Overturning Bowers v. Hardwick,157 the
Lawrence Court noted that both state legislatures (through repeal) and state
executives (through nonenforcement) had alerted it to changed circumstances.158 Similarly, the Court has also indicated its receptivity to agency
decisionmaking as constitutional interpretation.159 As Gillian Metzger
points out, in some contexts, “specific administrative mechanisms are not
constitutionally mandated but suffice to avoid constitutional violations.”160
For example, as in Wilkie v. Robbins, when administrative complaint systems
are robust enough, their existence can militate against the Court’s implication of a Bivens cause of action for a plaintiff seeking redress for constitutional violations by federal officials.161
The influence of the elected branches on doctrine can be significant. The
examples discussed here, and in the discussion of due process and welfare
rights cases above,162 suggest that the Court, concerned about its democratic
legitimacy, will often look to an elected branch to take the first steps. When
Congress will not, the President may have to lead by example.
b. The Executive as Litigator
Unlike Congress and most federal agencies, the President, through the
DOJ and the Solicitor General, is already a litigator—and an effective

155
156

Id.
See 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that a law criminalizing same-sex intercourse
violated the Due Process Clause).
157 See 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law criminalizing sodomy).
158 See 539 U.S. at 573 (“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced
in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct. In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, . . . there is a pattern of nonenforcement.”).
159 Gillian Metzger argues that agencies, knowledgeable about the regulatory schemes they
enforce, are capable of effectively enforcing constitutional norms. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 497-505 (2010). He
points to cases where the underenforcement of constitutional rights passes the opportunity for
realization of the Constitution to administrative agencies. Id. at 500.
160 Id. at 488.
161 551 U.S. 537 (2007). Professor Metzger cites to Wilkie, in which the Court held that
finding an implied private right of action based on the Court’s previous holding in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971), would be
inappropriate, because administrative remedies were available. Metzger, supra note 159, at 488
n.28 (citing Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 552-53). But see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
162 See supra subsection III.A.1.a.
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one.163 Therefore, through nondefense, he has a unique structural institutional competence over Congress in alerting the Court to a statute’s
unconstitutionality. The DOJ’s position-taking may even help encourage
plaintiffs to bring further cases, and thus create the kind of national legal
issue that will make the case all the more appealing to the Supreme
Court.164
Once litigation rises to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General has
advantages shared by few other litigators. He is more likely than any other
actor to secure Supreme Court review, and also to win once certiorari is
granted.165 As Ryan Black and Ryan Owens have found in their empirical
study of the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) success at the Supreme
Court, the data “points to considerable Solicitor General influence over
Supreme Court opinions.”166 Statistically ruling out explanations of better
Solicitor General experience or strategic case selection,167 Black and Owens
concluded that “the Court borrows more from OSG briefs because it trusts
the professional judgment of the lawyers within that office,” and “that the
OSG is indeed influential before the Court.”168 The OSG’s recommendation makes it considerably more likely that the Court will “treat . . .
precedent favorably”; likewise, a negative OSG recommendation makes it
far more likely that the Court will “negatively treat precedent by distinguishing it or overruling it.”169 Based on a comprehensive literature review
and their own statistical results, Owens and Black concluded that “OSG
recommendations, in short, drive doctrinal change.”170 These findings are
relevant because they suggest that through the Solicitor General, the
President can hope not simply to predict the course of the Court’s doctrine—and whether it will adequately protect minorities from majoritarian
tyranny—but also to influence those judicial outcomes that he must accept as
law. And he can hope to do so in a way that private litigants simply cannot.
163
164
165
166
167

See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 61, at 1212.
See supra note 82.
See BLACK & OWENS, supra note 64, at 23.
Id. at 111.
See id. at 111-12 (“If the OSG were so successful before the Court because its attorneys
have more experience than non-OSG attorneys, we would have observed the Court borrowing the
same amount of language from OSG briefs and non-OSG briefs when matching on attorney
experience. . . . [And p]ut plainly, if the OSG were picking cases strategically that it knew it
would win, we would not retrieve the results our models produced.”).
168 Id. at 112.
169 Id. at 132-33.
170 Id. at 133; see also Lincoln Caplan, The President’s Lawyer, and the Court’s, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2001, at A19 (“The Supreme Court has bestowed on the [S]olicitor [G]eneral a special status—
seeking the [Solicitor General’s] advice in many cases where the government isn’t even a party.
And the [Solicitor General] has reciprocated by fulfilling a special role in court.”).
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History, too, instructs on the power of presidential involvement in litigation, even before it reaches the Supreme Court. Presidents Truman’s and
Kennedy’s DOJs were very active in influencing the Court’s equal protection
decisions from the 1940s through the 1960s, but these efforts began long
before the controversies reached the Justices.171 For instance, in Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, the Attorney General’s tactic of supporting the plaintiffs in attacking a federal law tolerating segregated hospital
facilities helped move the Fourth Circuit to strike down the law.172 Simkins
followed a long tradition of Cold War agenda-setting before the Court by
President Truman’s DOJ,173 which began its campaign with an amicus brief
in Shelley v. Kraemer,174 in which the Court held that state action to enforce
a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant violated the Equal Protection
Clause.175 After the President’s Committee on Civil Rights advanced three
reasons—moral, economic, and international—for redressing civil rights
abuses,176 President Truman, concerned about the international perception
of racism in America and finding that he could not count on Congress to
address these problems, directed the DOJ to argue his position to the
Court.177 Thus, the movement that began with invalidating discriminatory
restrictive covenants moved on to tackle “international implications of
segregation” with the DOJ’s involvement in opposing the discriminatory
position of the Interstate Commerce Commission178 in Henderson v. United
States.179 Eventually, the DOJ participated in Sweatt v. Painter,180 McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,181 Brown v. Board of Educa171
172

See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 90-106, 178-202.
323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 1963); see also P. Preston Reynolds, Professional and Hospital
Discrimination and the U.S. Court of Appeals: Fourth Circuit 1956-1967, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 710,
713 (describing the Justice Department’s stance in support of the plaintiffs’ successful contention
that the use of federal funds in a discriminatory manner is unconstitutional).
173 See DUDZIAK, supra note 119, at 90-106.
174 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(Nos. 72, 87, 290 & 291).
175 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
176 See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 101-02
(1988) (describing how President Truman took important steps towards racial equality by
desegregating the military by Executive order).
177 Id. at 103-05.
178 Id. at 106.
179 See 339 U.S. 816, 826 (1950) (holding that segregation in railroad cars violated the Interstate Commerce Act).
180 See 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950) (striking down, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas’s policy prohibiting blacks from attending an all-white law school).
181 See 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950) (holding that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a black
graduate student was entitled to equal treatment from a state-supported school as students of
other races).
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tion,182 and Bolling v. Sharpe.183 Just as Robin West argues that Congress
“exists to do distributive justice” by enacting the “aspirational Constitution,”184 the President could be said to exist (at least in part) to do distributive justice by litigating the aspirational Constitution. And in those rare
cases in which the Solicitor General raises the President’s concerns with a
statute’s constitutionality, the Court listens.185
Finally, the President has other capabilities well suited for alerting the
Court to the need for a heightened standard of review. Through his
command of the Executive Branch, he can move faster than either Congress186 or litigation. This increased speed can help to ameliorate deprivations that subject minorities to continuous harm.187 Similarly, his
nondefense decision can give the DOJ and other agencies the space they
need to read the Constitution broadly and assert such expansive arguments
in and out of court.188 President Kennedy, for instance, issued an Executive
order declaring discrimination in federal employment and contracting
unconstitutional, establishing the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, and directing agencies “to initiate forthwith studies of
current government employment practices within their responsibility.”189 A
year later, Kennedy issued another order, requiring “all [relevant] departments and agencies in the executive branch . . . to take all action necessary
and appropriate to prevent discrimination because of race, color, creed, or
national origin” in housing, and appointing a Committee to oversee agency
progress.190 At first glance, this analogue to the nondefense context seems
182 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.”).
183 See 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (extending Brown’s holding to the District of Columbia
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause).
184 ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 311-12 (1994).
185 See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1081-83 (2001).
186 Consider the problem of the filibuster: “sixty votes . . . are commonly required to enact
major and controversial legislation.” WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND
THE POLICY PROCESS 272 (8th ed. 2011).
187 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 689 (“[E]ven where private parties can get courts to respond
to their constitutional harms, they may face interstitial deprivations. Individuals suffer injury in
the time lag between constitutional harm and relevant judicial response.”).
188 For example, President Kennedy encouraged the Federal Communications Commission
to affirmatively read the Constitution to apply equal employment opportunity policies against the
broadcasters it regulated, even as the FCC continued to receive a “cool reception” from most of
the rest of the federal government. See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 811-12, 820 (2010).
189 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
190 Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962).
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imperfect, since nondefense involves slow-moving litigation. However, the
fact that the President can move swiftly through other, nonlitigation channels
means that he can coordinate policy, repeal, and public outreach efforts with
nondefense—a strategy unavailable to Congress. In turn, these efforts have
the potential to make litigation efforts themselves more effective.191
Once litigation has begun, the President’s institutional capacity to act
swiftly comes into play yet again as a tool for elaborating constitutional law.
If the President is convinced that a statute violates equal protection, then
the DOJ can push for recognition of rights and equality, as it did in its
lower-court litigation in Plyler v. Doe.192 And he can push the DOJ and
Solicitor General to take consistent positions to help ensure that the issue
reaches the Supreme Court.193 Indeed, his nondefense decision is important
because it may help push the Supreme Court to accept his view when it
might otherwise remain deferential to an intransigent Congress through the
rational basis standard.
c. Bringing Democratic Legitimacy to Litigation
The democratic legitimacy of the President bolsters his authority,194 and
especially so given the Court’s receptiveness to changing notions of equal
protection.195 The Executive’s institutional competence as a litigator and the
President’s national constituency render the Executive the best branch for
signaling to the Court that it should change its standard of review. Indeed,
the Executive is the only branch capable of doing so—if the desired change
191 See Pillard, supra note 85, at 749 (noting that, unlike the courts, the elected branches have
institutional competencies in “agenda-setting and factfinding,” and the executive branch also has
capacity to “prioritize, lead, and set an example for other political officials”).
192 Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that denying education to
children of illegal immigrants violates the Equal Protection Clause), aff’d, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1980), aff’d, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The DOJ dropped its equal protection arguments in its amicus
brief at the Supreme Court, because of its “view that this is an issue that affects state rather than
federal interests.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5 n.3, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538 & 80-1934).
193 See infra Part IV.C; see also Solicitor General’s Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra
note 132, at 12 (“[W]e respectfully seek this Court’s review so that the question may be authoritatively decided by this Court. . . . [T]o ensure that the Judiciary is the final arbiter of Section 3 [of
DOMA]’s constitutionality, the President has instructed Executive departments and agencies to
continue to enforce Section 3 until there is a definitive judicial ruling that Section 3 is unconstitutional.”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 10, Office of Pers. Mgmt. v.
Golinski, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012) (same) available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/12-16-Golinski-Petition-final.pdf.
194 By contrast, scholars note that the Court lacks democratic legitimacy. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1391 (2006) (explaining that
legislators, unlike judges, are accountable to their constituents).
195 See supra subsection III.A.1.
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would ratchet up the level of scrutiny—when Congress is acting unconstitutionally. Unlike Congress, the President can combine nondefense in the
courts with position-taking outside the courts.196 Specifically, he can urge
repeal of the offending statute, release public statements, issue Executive
orders, and, in the process, foster dialogue that helps repopularize the
democratic process.197 To a degree, these actions may help assuage the
Court’s concerns that striking down a statute—a countermajoritarian act—is
antidemocratic. If the President ultimately influences the Court’s decision
and also fosters popular dialogue about the provision at issue, then the
President will have, in a sense, helped to democratize and aspirationalize
the Constitution.
d. The President’s Accountability Outside the Courtroom
While in-court advocacy is consistent with the President’s political
role,198 the President’s out-of-court advocacy deserves further attention. As
a political actor, he can also seek to change hearts and minds199 in ways that
the Court cannot.200 And the President is politically accountable when he

196 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 63, at 98-100 (noting that “[e]lected officials can
encourage appropriate judicial action through . . . public statements” and providing examples).
197 Cf. KRAMER, supra note 27, at 227-48 (arguing for a return to the popular constitutionalism of the Founding Generation). Perhaps this argument is simply a restatement of the notion
that, given the Framers’ intended checks and balances, the President should check the legislature
by making his own constitutional interpretations.
198 See Carlos A. Ball, When May A President Refuse to Defend a Statute? The Obama Administration and DOMA, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77, 89 (2011) (arguing that, when the
constitutional question involves assessing whether the targeted group has long suffered “invidious
discrimination” irrelevant to ability, the President confronts “broad normative and policy
questions that should give [him] greater . . . authority to make independent constitutional
assessments”).
199 E.g., Remarks on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1106 ( July 19, 1995). President Clinton asked:

How did this [progress in confronting racism] happen? Fundamentally, because we
opened our hearts and minds and changed our ways. But not without pressure—the
pressure of court decisions, legislation, Executive action, and the power of examples
in the public and private sector. Along the way we learned that laws alone do not
change society; that old habits and thinking patterns are deeply ingrained and die
hard; that more is required to really open the doors of opportunity.
Id. at 1108.
200 The aftermath of Brown revealed that changed hearts and minds do not necessarily result
from legal rulings. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 40405 (1999) (describing Eisenhower’s eventual decision to use troops to enforce Brown’s holding and
stop the constitutional violation of ongoing segregation at an Arkansas public high school).
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decides not to defend a statute.201 He can always do nothing, and in essence
tell constituents either to turn to Congress or to rely solely on the courts.
But as the official with the broadest constituency, he can also speak with a
political voice.
*

*

*

The bottom line is that, where the Court underenforces the Constitution—whether with regard to procedural due process for welfare benefits,
the First Amendment, or equal protection under a rational basis standard—
the Executive and Legislative branches retain the power to interpret the
Constitution above the floor that the Court has established.202 But sometimes Congress not only fails to erect an adequate ceiling—that is, by
extending rights or entitlements above and beyond what the Constitution
requires—but also digs into the floor’s very foundations by enacting a
statute depriving some minority of the equal protection of the laws. In such
circumstances, the Executive bears the responsibility of persuading the
Court to elevate its level of scrutiny from rational basis to a heightened
standard. This responsibility is especially acute where the questionable
classification resembles race and sex in its immutability. Nondefense
appropriately responds to the gravity of denying minorities the equal
protection of the laws by increasing the probability that the Court will hear
the case and address the ongoing deprivation of individuals’ rights.
B. A New Model for Nondefense Decisionmaking
In this Section, I present my modifications to the Dellinger/Johnsen
framework for the equal protection context. I begin by explaining why a
new model is necessary. Even the weakest argument for these modifications
reveals the need for a new decisionmaking framework: The President who
must decide whether to defend a statute he believes should receive, and
would fail, heightened equal protection scrutiny requires a decisional
framework. So long as it is reliable, and all else being equal, the standard
201 See Gorod, supra note 61, at 1243-44 (explaining that the public will often “assume that the
views the Executive Branch is expressing are its own,” so “forcing the Executive Branch to make
arguments in which it does not belief—or prohibiting it from making affirmative arguments in which
it does—hurts the President’s ability to effectively use his office as a bully pulpit”); Rao, supra note
21, at 553 (pointing out that the People can hold the President accountable if they disagree with
his decision not to enforce a statute).
202 Cf. Strauss, supra note 21, at 114 (“[A]s the judicial definition is taking shape, there is
nonetheless substantial legitimate room for the executive branch to assert and persist in its own
readings of legal authority.”).
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that gives him the most guidance will also be the most helpful. After
demonstrating the usefulness of these modifications, I present the additional
questions that constitute the modified model. Finally, as a thought experiment to address the concerns raised earlier in the Section, I offer how the
model would impact a nondefense decision outside the equal protection
context.
1. Why a New Model is Necessary
I propose modifications to the Dellinger/Johnsen model for two primary
reasons. First, while I have argued that Dellinger’s nonenforcement framework can be adapted to the nondefense context, the foregoing discussion
reveals that there are concerns that are particularly salient in the equal
protection context: the President has both the responsibility and the ability
to help influence the Court’s development of equal protection jurisprudence
that protects minorities who have experienced pervasive discrimination.
The modified model that I propose better accounts for those instances in
which the President believes that the Court should apply heightened
scrutiny to find a statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.
Concededly, Dellinger’s model is able to accommodate equal protection
cases. In fact, in 1996, Dellinger advised President Clinton not to defend a
statute that would require the discharge of all HIV-positive members of the
military on equal protection grounds.203 Clinton accepted this advice after
conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and concluding that “the provision
does not serve any valid military or other purpose.” He resolved that the DOJ
would not defend its constitutionality if it was challenged in litigation.204
There, however, Assistant Attorney General Dellinger and Counsel to
the President Jack Quinn relied on an argument based on rational basis
review.205 It was not, according to their reasoning, a circumstance in which
the Court should apply heightened scrutiny; the statute did not classify on
the basis of an arguably innate, immutable condition. Similarly, of the
historical nondefense decisions to which Dellinger could point, only

203
204
205

See Quinn & Dellinger, supra note 75 (statement of Walter Dellinger).
Id.
See id. (statement of Jack Quinn) (“[T]he question the courts ask is, is there a rational
basis for this discrimination? Does it serve some valid, legitimate, rational government objective?
The people to whom that question is properly put by the President are the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.”).
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Simkins206 and Gavett v. Alexander207 involved equal protection issues, and
only Simkins addressed a standard more searching than rational basis.208
Therefore, the nondefense decisionmaking model deserves further elaboration for situations implicating equal protection concerns, where the
Court might employ a standard too deferential toward Congress—i.e.,
rational basis review instead of heightened scrutiny. The modifications I
suggest would help a decisionmaker appropriately balance important
separation-of-powers concerns with alleged infringements of individual
rights. They also help point the way toward actions the President can take
to further the democratic legitimacy of an eventual nondefense posture.
Second, these modifications serve to highlight the sui generis nature of
presidential nondefense decisions in that subset of equal protection cases
where the President believes that the Court should apply heightened
scrutiny. Crucially, the inquiry, as a whole, can serve as a limiting principle
for Presidents who, in the words of Orin Kerr, would like “a great deal of
power to decide what legislation to defend, increasing executive branch
power at the expense of Congress’s power. . . . [I]t will be a power grab
disguised as academic constitutional interpretation.”209 My proposed
modifications impel the President to ask more questions, not fewer, and
exhort him to justify, more comprehensively, an ultimate decision not to
defend a statute. Moreover, because they focus on the equal protection
context, the modifications mitigate slippery slope arguments against nondefense, namely that future Presidents could assert the authority not to
enforce laws, such as the Affordable Care Act, based on policy disagreements expressed as Commerce Clause jurisprudence.210 My additional
206
207

See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
477 F. Supp. 1035, 1043-44 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting a DOJ decision not to defend a statute
and staying litigation for forty-five days, to enable congressional intervention).
208 See Letter from Andrew Fois, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch (Mar. 22, 1996), reprinted in 1 J.L. (1 PUB. L. MISC.) 19, 22-27 (2011), http://journaloflaw.
us/0%20JoL/1-1/Jol1-1.pdf (listing the cases in which the DOJ declined to defend the constitutionality of a statute).
209 Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-Executive-power-grabin-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma; see also Richard Epstein, Dumb on DOMA, RICOCHET (Feb.
23, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Dumb-on-DOMA (“[T]he choice of the
President to surrender unilaterally (which could have been anticipated from his earlier actions)
makes it unclear whether any private party has standing to defend DOMA. . . . This action
therefore could lead to a constitutional crisis of some significance.”).
210 See Igor Volsky, Rick Perry Fails Govt 101: Claims Executive Orders Can Repeal Laws Passed
by Congress, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 3, 2011, 9:08 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2011/12/03/
381485/rick-perry-failed-govt-101-claims-Executive-orders-can-repeal-laws-passed-by-congress (“Rick
Perry repeatedly insisted that the President has the authority to block the implementation of the
Affordable Care Act, despite a recent Congressional Research Service report finding to the
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questions are uniquely solicitous toward nondefense decisions responding to
the Carolene Products concerns discussed earlier,211 and serve as a constant
reminder to the President that, by contrast, he should be hesitant to make
nondefense decisions in other contexts.
Similarly, would the consideration of whether to defend the constitutionality of a statute result in a different decision under Dellinger’s framework than under my framework, in either an equal protection or a non–
equal protection case? I offer three observations in light of the modifications
I propose below. First, regardless of whether the President would make a
different decision under Dellinger’s model than under my modifications, the
modifications should influence the manner in which he carries out the
decisionmaking process and its aftermath. For instance, while President
Obama would likely have decided not to defend DOMA under either
framework, my suggestions push the President toward the provision of
more extensive justifications for his position, both in the courts and to the
public. Second, as I discuss below in subsection III.B.3, my framework also
helps to shed light on potential nondefense decisions outside the equal
protection context. Finally, the additional value of my elaborated factors
becomes clearer in Part IV, where I apply the model to President Obama’s
decision not to defend DOMA. If nothing else, the suggestions I provide
elaborate the decisional framework for a President who needs core principles to guide him in making his nondefense decision.
2. The Modified Model
Some guiding questions help to address the concerns discussed above.
First, did Congress itself consider the constitutionality of the statute in
question?212 If so, how does its analysis compare with one the Court might
undertake, especially given changed circumstances? Next, is the President
taking other actions, such as publicly advancing his reasoning, to make
contrary.”); see also Kerr, supra note 209 (expressing concern that “the Executive Branch [will]
essentially ha[ve] the power to decide what legislation it will defend based on whatever views of
the Constitution are popular or associated with that Administration.”). Obviously, the Commerce
Clause question in the Affordable Care Act case did not raise Carolene Products concerns. See Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616-17 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (explaining that “we owe a large
measure of respect to Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social legislation”). For
more on the intersection of politics, policy, and law, see generally, for example, Paul D. Clement,
The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 311, 317 (2009); Gorod, supra note 61, at
1246; and Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1214. See also generally supra note 12.
211 See supra Section III.A.
212 Cf. Johnsen, supra note 49, at 35 (explaining that evidence of such consideration by Congress should be relevant to the President’s enforcement decision).
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nondefense effective and himself politically accountable? Additionally, have
lower courts considered the constitutionality of the provision, and if so,
how do their analyses impact the President’s evaluation of any changed
circumstances?
To address the foregoing questions, I propose the following new model
for presidential nondefense of statutes. It begins, like the Dellinger/Johnsen
model, with the understanding that the President will sometimes need to
make his own interpretations under the Take Care Clause.213 Second, while
the President should endeavor to correct unconstitutional provisions
through the legislative process, he should also ask whether repeal would
deprive the issue of judicial resolution.214
Third, when considering the offending provision’s constitutionality, the
President should employ a standard more searching than the Supreme
Court’s rational basis standard. The focus here should be on examining
what Congress did and thoroughly exploring why it did so—and whether
the reasons proffered truly justify its objectives.215 At this point, the inquiry
should not yet turn to which level of scrutiny the Court would or should
apply—with all the baggage that a level of judicial scrutiny carries.216 Why
not simply use the heightened scrutiny test? The President should move
away—even if only a short distance—from the narrow confines of the
Court’s three-tiered equal protection jurisprudence: the whole point of
nondefense is that simply applying a certain tier of judicial scrutiny, in this
case rational basis, will not always suffice. While the judgment regarding an

213 See supra Section II.A; see also Devins & Prakash, supra note 10, at 523 (“[E]ven as Article
II requires faithful execution of constitutional laws, it forbids the Executive from executing
unconstitutional ones.” (footnote omitted)).
214 The ramifications of this inquiry are outside the scope of this Comment. However, repeal
of a discriminatory act will not necessarily end discrimination based on the same classification by
either the federal government or state governments. Thus, I suggest that the President at least
assess the added value in choosing not to defend an unconstitutional provision, rather than only
seeking to have it repealed.
215 Consider, for instance, the standard that the Court has adopted under the Administrative
Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” provision. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The
reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”). In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Court explained that when a plaintiff challenges an agency’s regulation under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the agency has the burden of justifying its rule based on the actual reasons it
considered in deciding to adopt the rule—the agency’s actual contemporaneous rationality. 463
U.S. 29, 42-44, 43 n.9, 50 (1983). Whereas under rational basis review, Congress might be able to
adduce reasons to support its decision after the fact, an agency bears the burden of demonstrating
that its actual reasoning, contemporaneous with its decision, supports that decision. Id. at 50.
216 See supra notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text.
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offending provision’s constitutionality is ultimately a legal one, some judges
and Justices may not yet understand why a different tier should apply.217
Thus, I would instead incorporate simple actual contemporaneous rationality review into the President’s nondefense decisionmaking framework. I
would clarify that it must not be “toothless,”218 and it should be adjusted
upward where the equal protection considerations of immutability and
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”219 suggest that some form
of heightened scrutiny is appropriate. In calibrating his own scrutiny level,
the President should consider whether individuals in the group Congress
has classified have been “subjected to discrimination,” whether they “exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group,” and whether they are “a minority or politically powerless.”220 Even where these criteria are less than fully fulfilled, the President
should act on the basis that objectives such as “‘a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group’ are not legitimate state interests,” nor are
“mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are
properly cognizable.”221 These considerations will allow him to better assess
the Carolene Products concerns discussed above.222
To the assessment of these factors, the President should bring his institutional factfinding capacity to bear. He should ask whether circumstances
have changed and examine shifts in social indicators and lower court
interpretations (and the Supreme Court’s interpretations, even if they are
simply suggestive), as well as assess the magnitude of the ongoing harm
caused by the offending provision. The contemporaneousness component of
this standard would ensure that the President explored any animosity on
the part of Congress that might have infected the statute and that the
217 Cf. Conversation with Walter Dellinger, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP ( July 13,
2012) (questioning why the executive branch should be bound by the way that courts think about
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection).
218 See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (qualifying the rational basis standard).
219 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[R]ace, like gender and illegitimacy,
is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside. . . . ‘[L]egal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing,’ and . . .
advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the State should ideally be based on
individual merit or achievement, or at the least on factors within the control of an individual.”
(citations omitted)).
220 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986)).
221 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447, 448 (1985) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
222 See supra Section III.A.
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justifications proffered for the provision were consistent with changing
notions of equality. In other words, the President should ask what actually
motivated Congress at the time it passed the offending statute, in addition
to whatever reasonable arguments might support the statute after the fact.
This point is consistent with the fourth point, that while the President
should consider what the Court would do, he should ask the question less
with a predictive tenor, and more with a normative strategic thrust.
Nondefense is an opportunity for the President to assert his better view of
the offending provision’s constitutionality (i.e., better than the judgment he
predicts the Court will make), with the intention of persuading the Court to
adopt that view. Thus, even if there might be nonfrivolous rational basis
arguments supporting the constitutionality of the offending statute, the
DOJ need not raise them if the President believes that heightened scrutiny
should apply—he need not undermine his argument that a more searching
standard is required by arguing, essentially, in the alternative.223
Fifth, he should continue to seek judicial review of the issue by instructing the DOJ to flesh out his nondefense arguments in litigation, appealing
district or appellate rulings (even those agreeing with his arguments),224
producing a publicly available advisory opinion, and taking his case to the
court of public opinion.
In combination, these considerations will provide the President with
more robust guidance when he makes his nondefense decision and should,
in turn, lead him to the right result more often.
3. Nondefense Decisions Outside the Equal Protection Context
As a practical matter, the President has little reason to be personally
concerned with deciding whether to enforce or defend every allegedly
unconstitutional statute on the books during his administration. The
Dellinger/Johnsen framework relies, to a large degree, on there being few

223 But see Conversation with Walter Dellinger, supra note 217. Dellinger points out that,
with the Holder Letter, the DOJ had not flatly refused to defend DOMA, nor should it have; the
DOJ could simultaneously take the position that heightened scrutiny is the right standard and
DOMA cannot survive it, but that it would defend it under rational basis scrutiny. Id.; see also
Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“If asked by the district courts in the Second Circuit for the position of
the United States in the event those courts determine that the applicable standard is rational basis,
the Department will state that, consistent with the position it has taken in prior cases, a reasonable
argument for Section 3’s constitutionality may be proffered under that permissive standard.”).
224 The DOJ should be able to appeal a loss even if it agrees with the plaintiff. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983) (“[T]he INS’s agreement with the Court of Appeals’ decision
that [the statute] is unconstitutional does not affect that agency’s ‘aggrieved’ status for purposes of
appealing that decision.”).
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statutes that will clearly present significant and serious constitutional
questions. This subsection briefly addresses what a President might do
when there is a very strong argument that a statute is facially unconstitutional for reasons other than violation of equal protection principles.
The case of United States v. Alvarez225 serves as a hypothetical for how
this framework could work in the First Amendment context. There, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b),
which made it a crime for a person to “falsely represent[] himself or herself,
verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.”226 The
court observed that “Alvarez was not prosecuted for impersonating a
military officer, or lying under oath, or making false statements in order to
unlawfully obtain benefits. There was not even a requirement the government prove he intended to mislead. He was prosecuted simply for saying
something that was not true.”227 Because lying, without more, does not fit
into one of the few categories of speech excepted from First Amendment
protection, and because § 704(b) did not otherwise pass strict scrutiny, the
Ninth Circuit struck down the provision as facially unconstitutional.228
The President instructed neither the DOJ nor the Solicitor General not
to defend the statute. Nonetheless, the constitutional infirmity of § 704(b)
seemed fairly clear. Under the rigorous First Amendment jurisprudence,
“[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden
of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”229 When the government’s
restriction is content-based, the government must either show that the
speech in question fits into “a few limited,” narrow, and well-defined
historical categories, or that the regulation passes strict scrutiny.230 Outside
the context of false commercial speech, lies, in and of themselves, have
never been one of these categories, and the Court has been extremely

225 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (Alvarez I), reh’g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666 (2011) (Alvarez
II), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (Alvarez III).
226 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006), declared unconstitutional by Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. 2537.
227 Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1218.
228 Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. See Alvarez II, 638 F.3d 666.
Chief Judge Kozinski explained, “Without the robust protection of the First Amendment, the
white lies, exaggeration and deception that are an integral part of human intercourse would
become targets of censorship, subject only to the rubber stamp known as “rational basis review.” Id.
at 673 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).
229 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000).
230 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733-34 (2011).
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resistant to recognizing any previously unrecognized categories.231 Since
§ 704(b) did not fit any such categories, the question seemed to become
whether it passed strict scrutiny, and “[i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”232 In Alvarez, the
Ninth Circuit quickly dismissed any such argument that § 704(b) would
pass strict scrutiny.233
If President Obama had applied Dellinger’s framework, he might have
asked what the Court was likely to do. He would have been on strong
footing, supported by an appellate decision, despite another to the contrary,234
in asserting that § 704(b) was unconstitutional. He might thus have refused
to defend § 704(b). Of course, recognizing his role as Commander-in-Chief,
and the harmful nature, to veterans, of lies about military medals, the President also might have continued to defend the statute (and indeed he did).
Yet suppose hypothetically that President Obama was concerned about
§ 704(b)’s constitutionality. Under my framework—even when applied
outside of the equal protection context—the President would have made
further inquiries that would have made him less likely to refuse to defend the
statute. He would have asked about Congress’s actual contemporaneous
rationality, and found that Congress both made formal findings235 and
debated the merits of the statute.236 These very sources could have helped
the President determine what Congress intended and whether the intent
was consistent with First Amendment standards. The President could have
brought his institutional capacities as Commander-in-Chief to bear on these
questions and ask what effect the provision would have had on the military,
much as Clinton did in the context of HIV-positive individuals.237 And the
President would have found no indicia of the Carolene Products problem—
i.e., the tyranny of the majority over a minority, and especially not a
minority with an immutable condition. Rather, he would have seen that

231 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (“Our [previous] decisions . . .
cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech
outside the scope of the First Amendment.”).
232 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).
233 Alvarez I, 617 F.3d at 1216 (“Even the dissent agrees that the Act fails strict scrutiny.”).
234 United States v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding § 704(b)
under so-called breathing space review), abrogated by Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. 2537.
235 Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2, 120 Stat. 3266.
236 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 22,575 (2006) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.); id. at
22,575 (statement of Rep. John Kline); id. at 22,574-75 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner);
151 CONG. REC. 12,688-89 (2005) (statement of Sen. Kent Conrad).
237 See supra notes 60 & 165 and accompanying text.
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Congress had documented that the government in fact had arguably
compelling interests at least rationally related to § 704(b).238
The President would then have asked what the Court would do and
would have sought to ensure that there was judicial review. Here, because
of the stringent standards applied to content-based regulations in the First
Amendment context, the President would have had reason to believe that
the Court might in fact strike down § 704(b) without any need for him to
suggest that it do so, even if, after the foregoing inquiry, he had come to the
conclusion that the law ought to fall. And indeed, a plurality of the Court
did strike down § 704(b), after noting that “[t]he Government has not
demonstrated that false statements generally should constitute a new
category of unprotected speech,” and that “[t]he lack of a causal link
between the Government’s stated interest and the Act” shows that “the Act
is not actually necessary to achieve the Government’s stated interest.”239
*

*

*

In short, even a First Amendment issue, especially one of limited scope,
does not necessarily raise the types of concerns discussed earlier in this
Part—in particular, tyranny of the majority and the risk that the Court may
apply too deferential a standard. My gloss on the nondefense decisionmaking
framework helps to serve as a limiting principle for future nondefense
decisions.
IV. APPLYING THE NEW MODEL TO PRESIDENT
OBAMA’S NONDEFENSE OF DOMA
I now apply this model—albeit after the fact—to President Obama’s
decision to instruct the Department of Justice not to defend the Defense of
Marriage Act. Note that, while this application requires some consideration
of the merits of heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
orientation, the two inquiries are not the same. Here, the discussion focuses
on the decisionmaking process itself.240
238 Strandlof, 667 F.3d at 1168-69 (“[T]he government has an important—perhaps compelling—interest in preventing individuals from falsely claiming to have received military awards.”).
239 Alvarez III, 132 S. Ct. at 2547-49 (plurality opinion).
240 For arguments that sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny, see Superseding Brief for Appellant at 21-22, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss at 827, Pederson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012) (No. 10-1750)
[hereinafter DOJ’s Pederson Brief]; Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 3-18,
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At this point, one might again reasonably ask what my five-step model
adds to the Dellinger/Johnsen framework. My model demands an extensive
inquiry into the merits of both positions—that the statute is constitutional
or that it is unconstitutional. The actual contemporaneous rationality
standard ensures as much, because it cuts both ways. But it is also slightly
less deferential to Congress and the Judiciary than Dellinger’s model, which
asks primarily how the Court would resolve the issue. Of course, we do not
know what the Court will say about DOMA; the result could, but need not,
turn on the difference between rational basis review and heightened
scrutiny. But my modifications increase the likelihood that, in situations
like the decision not to defend DOMA, the President will not merely
cursorily state that the act is unconstitutional—as Clinton did when
refusing to enforce the HIV provision241—but will instead provide substantial guidance to explain the decision to the public, as well as influencing,
rather than merely predicting, the Court’s outcome.
This democratic demand for transparency is valuable. And, as the following discussion makes clear, in addition to the Holder Letter, the DOJ
has provided extensive guidance to the Court and the public that explains
why DOMA should be judged under heightened scrutiny and be found
unconstitutional on that basis. Finally, my model suggests just how distinct
equal protection violations are, and it suggests the importance of looking
into and openly addressing the particular constitutional value at issue.
In this Part, I will show that President Obama’s decision not to defend
DOMA comports with the five-step model proposed above. Obama
assessed the suggested criteria and ultimately reached a decision where he is
prepared to defer—in the final judgment—to the Judiciary. I first address
Obama’s consideration of the Take Care Clause and repeal efforts. Then, I
discuss how Obama and the DOJ evaluated the constitutionality of the statute
and considered Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality, changes in
circumstances, whether the law had changed, and the magnitude of the
ongoing harm. Finally, I explore how the DOJ has sought—and sought to
influence—judicial review—thereby respecting the separation of powers.

Golinski v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 10-0257) [hereinafter
DOJ’s Golinski Brief]. For an appellate holding to this effect, see infra notes 353-59 and accompanying text.
241 See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1
PUB. PAPERS 227, 227 (Feb. 10, 1996) (“I have concluded that this discriminatory provision is
unconstitutional. Specifically, it violates equal protection by requiring the discharge of qualified
service members living with HIV who are medically able to serve, without furthering any
legitimate governmental purpose.”).

344

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 291

A. The Take Care Clause and Repeal Efforts
President Obama has considered his role and responsibilities under the
Take Care Clause. The Holder Letter acknowledges “the Executive’s
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and until
Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive verdict
against the law’s constitutionality.”242 First, Attorney General Holder
clearly explains that the President has found a middle ground by instructing
him to enforce, but not to defend, DOMA.243 Second, President Obama
also supports the Respect for Marriage Act, which would repeal DOMA,244
and his instrumental efforts in the repeal of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t
tell” policy show his support to be more than mere rhetoric.245 President
Obama is thus simultaneously pursuing both nondefense and repeal
strategies, while recognizing the reality that, in today’s Senate, the filibuster
means slim chances of repeal.246
B. Evaluating the Statute’s Constitutionality
In this Section, I show that Obama’s considerations complied with my
modified model. I first analyze whether Obama and the DOJ considered
Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality behind DOMA. Then, I
address their consideration of changed circumstances and law, as well as the
magnitude of the ongoing harm.
1. Actual Contemporaneous Rationality
If the Holder Letter is any indication, President Obama took this criterion to its logical conclusion. Holder describes looking to DOMA’s
legislative history and finding the House Report247 rife with “moral
242
243
244

See Holder Letter, supra note 2.
Id.
See S. 598, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (defining an individual as married under federal law if
the individual’s marriage is valid under the laws of any state); see also H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. § 3
(2011) (same); Colleen Curtis, President Obama Supports the Respect for Marriage Act, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG ( July 19, 2011, 6:43 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ blog/2011/07/19/Presidentobama-supports-respect-marriage-act (announcing President Obama’s support for the Respect for
Marriage Act).
245 See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Jesse
Lee, The President Signs Repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”: “Out of Many, We Are One”, WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/22/Presidentsigns-repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell-out-many-we-are-one.
246 See OLESZEK, supra note 186, at 272 (discussing the need for sixty votes given the frequent use of the filibuster).
247 H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 (1996) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
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disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family relationships—precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and animus the
Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”248
Holder’s characterization could not be more accurate: brimming with
the language of attack, assault, combat, war, and threats, the House Report
literally casts gay men and lesbians as the enemy and leaves little doubt as
to the how the Act’s name was selected.249 One of DOMA’s two stated
purposes “is to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage”
because “[t]he prospect of permitting homosexual couples to ‘marry’ . . .
threatens to have very real consequences.”250 By its own admission, Congress
was reacting to its incomprehension of Romer v. Evans,251 decided just one
month earlier, in which the Court held that a Colorado constitutional
amendment (Amendment 2) prohibiting government action designed to
protect homosexuals from discrimination violated the Equal Protection
Clause (under the rational basis standard) since it “raise[d] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.”252 Congress seized on Justice Scalia’s rhetoric; he
had declared that “[t]he Court ha[d] mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
spite.”253 In the Report, Congress itself declared war against the “orchestrated legal assault being waged” as part of a campaign “on religious,
cultural, and legal fronts” to secure gay marriage in the states.254 The report
cast DOMA as “a modest effort to combat” the threat of gay marriage and
declared that the time had come “to take sides in this culture war.”255 And as
with every war, the doves—here, the bill’s detractors—argued that the
hawks had no “factual basis” for declaring gay marriage a threat but had
instead “use[d] ignorance as an excuse for haste” by failing to hold hearings
to investigate the evidence.256
Against this backdrop, Obama and the DOJ asked whether the drafters
of the House Report had considered DOMA’s constitutionality under the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The answer they found
was, only perfunctorily. Unabashedly unable to make sense of Romer, the
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

Holder Letter, supra note 2.
See id. n.7 (collecting examples).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 2 (emphasis added).
See id. at 32 (“Romer is, to put it charitably, an elusive decision.”).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 2-3.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 42 (dissenting views) (“The notion that allowing two people who are in love to
become legally responsible to and for each other threatens heterosexual marriage is without factual
basis.”).
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drafters had nonetheless lambasted the Romer Court for foregoing “even a
cursory analysis of the interests Amendment 2 might serve.”257 To Congress,
sitting as a supercourt accusing the Supreme Court of sitting as a superlegislature, “it [was] inconceivable how Amendment 2 could fail to meet the rational
basis test.”258 “[N]othing, in the Court’s recent decision,” they concluded,
“suggests that the Defense of Marriage Act is constitutionally suspect.”259
The drafters proceeded to present the four government interests that
DOMA would advance260 while eliding the notion that the legislative
classifications must be rationally related to those interests.261 What Holder
must have seen in the legislative history—and what the drafters, ostensibly,
did and could not—was that DOMA was “born of animosity.”262 First, the
drafters asserted, the government had an “interest in defending and
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage” to promote
procreation and child-rearing.263 Holder dispelled this notion as “unreasonable” against the weight of “numerous studies,”264 and he might also have
cited Perry v. Schwarzenegger’s extensive findings of fact that children fare
no better in straight rather than gay households.265 Holder again stacked the
weight of modern science266 against the drafters’ claim that sexual orientation is mutable.267
Second, the drafters claimed that DOMA “advances the government’s
interest in defending traditional notions of morality”—“traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”268 Holder aptly addressed this contention,
too, by declaring it “precisely the kind of stereotype-based thinking and
257
258

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 32.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The drafters argued it was “inconceivable” because, in their eyes, Amendment 2 safeguarded “the freedom of association,” and “it is self-evident
that protecting that freedom is a legitimate government purpose.” Id.
259 Id. at 33.
260 Id. at 12.
261 See id. at 33 (“[T]he Defense of Marriage Act is also plainly constitutional under Romer.
The Committee briefly described above at least four legitimate government interests that are
advanced by this legislation—namely, defending the institution of traditional heterosexual
marriage; defending traditional notions of morality; protecting state sovereignty and democratic
self-governance; and preserving government resources. The Committee is satisfied that these
interests amply justify the enactment of this bill.”).
262 See id. at 32 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
263 Id. at 12-13.
264 Holder Letter, supra note 2.
265 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
266 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (explaining that claims that sexual orientation is mutable
“can[not] be reconciled with more recent social science understandings” and citing studies).
267 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 15 n.53 (“Maintaining a preferred societal status
of heterosexual marriage thus will also serve to encourage heterosexuality . . . .”).
268 Id. at 15-16.
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animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”269 Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment in Lawrence v. Texas provides
additional support for Holder’s stance. She explained that “[m]oral disapproval . . . , like a bare desire to harm [a] group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause.”270
Third, the drafters asserted that DOMA “advances the government’s
interest in protecting state sovereignty and democratic self-governance” by
taking the matter away from the courts.271 As a logical proposition, this
rationale is no better than the one often advanced to support courtstripping. It is both tautological and orthogonal to the rational basis
analysis. It asserts, “We have a legitimate interest in this law because we
agreed to pass it by majority vote”—a factor wholly irrelevant to (and,
indeed, often at odds with) constitutionality.
Fourth and finally, the drafters asserted that DOMA “advances the government’s interest in preserving scarce government resources.”272 Even
under the rational basis standard, however, the animus, moral disapproval,
and prejudice behind DOMA are clear, so the inquiry becomes not whether
saving money is a legitimate end, but whether the discriminatory classification Congress has chosen is a permissible means of tightening the fisc.273
Finally, the drafters’ failure to respond to the dissenting views’ due

269
270

Holder Letter, supra note 2.
539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). For support, Justice
O’Connor cited United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), in which the
Court explained that “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest” in striking down a law
determined to be merely a vehicle to harm “hippies.” Id. at 534.
271 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 16; see also An Examination of the Constitutional
Amendment on Marriage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Property
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of Professor Christopher
Wolfe) (“[G]iven the existence of a well-organized and financed effort to legalize same-sex
marriage in this country, backed by extensive ideological scholarship in the academy and in the
legal community, it is only prudent to remove even the possibility that judges will intervene to
strike down the Defense of Marriage Act and the State laws it was intended to protect.”).
272 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 18.
273 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“[W]here the distinction is drawn against a historically disadvantaged group and has no other
basis [than saving the government money], Supreme Court precedent marks this as a reason
undermining rather than bolstering the distinction.” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227
(1982))); cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (“The question is not whether such saving is a
legitimate purpose but whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory means it
has chosen.”).
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process274 and heightened scrutiny concerns275 only reinforces the poverty of
their actual contemporaneous constitutional assessment.276
2. Have Circumstances Changed?
As President, Obama has also been uniquely positioned to take stock of
social indicators, many of which point to the conclusion that heightened
scrutiny should apply to classifications based on sexual orientation. To
begin, as the Holder Letter observes, sexual orientation is immutable;277
there is a growing consensus on this point.278 Immutability satisfies one
criterion of the heightened scrutiny analysis.279 Social indicators of prejudice
satisfy another.280 Far from supporting discrimination based on sexual
orientation, polls show that popular opinion is shifting towards “seeing gay
and lesbian relations as morally acceptable”; support for same-sex marriage
“is near record highs.”281 Overall, the last few years have revealed a compel274 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 40 (dissenting views) (noting that the right to
marry is constitutionally protected (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978))).
275 See id. (“If an argument can be persuasive that the anti same sex marriage statute is discrimination based on gender, it may well receive intermediate scrutiny. . . . For strict scrutiny, the
court would have to . . . elevate classifications based on homosexuality to that of strict scrutiny, a
level which may be due . . . .” (emphasis added)).
276 There are parallels in the DOJ’s argument that multiple lower courts have failed to adequately consider the argument for heightened scrutiny over rational basis in evaluating DOMA.
See infra notes 353-372 and accompanying text.
277 See Holder Letter, supra note 2.
278 See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 98-108 (1992) (discussing “the biology of
‘deviant’ sex”). As early as 1992, Judge Posner translated this consensus into legal terms: “[T]o
discriminate . . . against persons on the basis of their sexual preference . . . is particularly suspect
because sexual preference is a largely immutable characteristic and therefore analogous to sex and
race, which under the jurisprudence of equal protection are—race especially—highly disfavored
grounds of discrimination.” Id. at 348 (citations omitted); see also Barbara L. Frankowski, Sexual
Orientation and Adolescents, 113 PEDIATRICS 1827, 1828 (2004) (“[T]he current literature and most
scholars in the field state that one’s sexual orientation is not a choice; that is, individuals do not
choose to be homosexual or heterosexual.”); Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 161-65 (2011) (discussing shifting definitions of immutability and the
disagreement among lower courts regarding whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic).
279 For factors relevant to the Court’s determination of whether a classification should receive heightened scrutiny, see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) and Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587, 602 (1987). See also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638 (considering, “[a]s a historical matter,” whether
a particular class has “been subjected to discrimination”; exhibits “obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define [it] as a discrete group”; and is “a minority or politically
powerless.”); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and
the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 504 (1998) (“[T]reating people differently
because of traits they cannot change violates fundamental norms of fairness and equality.”).
280 See supra note 279.
281 See Lydia Saad, Americans’ Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold, GALLUP
(May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/Americans-Acceptance-Gay-Relations-Crosses-
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ling trend toward societal acceptance of gays and lesbians.282 Moreover, as
much as Justice Scalia would claim that these changing social “mores” prove
that the lesbian and gay community is “a politically powerful minority”283
that has gotten the Court to “sign[] on to [its] so-called homosexual
agenda,”284 as Holder points out, (1) discrimination in the military and
employment demonstrate the political-legal reality for sexual-orientation
minorities, and (2) political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to the
application of heightened scrutiny, as the extension of heightened scrutiny
to sex-based classifications illustrates.285
In fact, the taint of sexual orientation discrimination affects lesbian- and
gay-identified individuals in all sectors of our society, even if one leaves the
issue of widespread marriage inequality to one side.286 Bigotry born
in schools287—where a full 90% of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and/or
transgender–identified youth experience bullying or harassment, more than
half feel unsafe,288 and some respond with suicide,289—spreads to places of
Threshold.aspx; see also, e.g., Kate Zernike, Conservatives’ Focus on Fiscal Matters Means Few Care
About a Gay Republican, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at A9 (“In a New York Times/CBS News poll
conducted in March 2004, a plurality of Americans under 45—35 percent—said there should be no
legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships. Forty-five percent of Americans 45 and older
said the same. By April 2010, just 24 percent of Americans ages 18 to 44 surveyed said that there
should be no legal recognition, and 35 percent of Americans 45 and older said the same.”).
282 See, e.g., Charles M. Blow, Gay? Whatever, Dude, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at A21 (describing society’s increasingly accepting views of gays and lesbians).
283 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285 Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“[W]hen the Court ruled that gender-based classifications
were subject to heightened scrutiny, women already had won major political victories such as the
Nineteenth Amendment (right to vote) and protection under Title VII (employment discrimination).”).
286 Twenty-nine states constitutionally define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman, and twelve bar the state from recognizing same-sex marriage. See John Schwartz, After
New York, New Look at Defense of Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A12.
287 In 2008–2009, for instance, the New York public school system reported nearly 900
incidents of harassment based on sexual orientation. Al Baker, Bratton’s Law-and-Order Appeal for
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/03/31/brattons-law-and-order-appeal-for-same-sex-marriage.
288 JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE 2009
NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 25-29 (2010) (surveying all types of
harassment, from cyberbullying to physical assault). See generally STUART BIEGEL & SHEILA
JAMES KUEHL, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAFE AT SCHOOL: ADDRESSING THE SCHOOL
ENVIRONMENT AND LGBT SAFETY THROUGH POLICY AND LEGISLATION (2010), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Biegel-Kuehl-Safe-At-School-Oct-2011.pdf
(making similar findings, and proposing model legislation).
289 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1557 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2011) (statement of Sen. Franken)
(“Justin was a kind young man, friendly and cheerful, a budding composer, but he was also the
target for bullies at his high school, who targeted him because he was different—because he was
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employment290 and the private housing market.291 In addition, same-sex
spouses are frequently denied visiting rights at hospitals292 and face further
unequal treatment under the law with respect to jointly held property,293
estate294 and income tax,295 entitlements and military benefits,296 and
immigration.297
Holder succinctly and effectively disputed that gay men and women are
a politically powerful group.298 He could have elaborated, however, for
viewing gay men and women as a politically powerful minority conflates
effort with outcome. While they have filed a number of lawsuits,299 they had

gay. . . . His family lost him to suicide last summer. . . . [U]nfortunately, there are a lot of other
kids out there struggling to get through school as they suffer from bullying and harassment and
discrimination at their public schools. . . . This harassment deprives them of an equal education.”).
290 For examples of a host of lawsuits brought alleging sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, see 2 L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 9:12 & n.3 (2012) .
291 See Press Release, John Kerry—U.S. Senator for Massachusetts: Press Room, Kerry
Legislation Would Outlaw LGBT Discrimination in Housing, Credit (Sept. 22, 2011), available at
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=751ff93c-d922-4f6b-887e-90920819fc13 (“Still today, prejudiced
landlords are discriminating against LGBT and other innocent tenants—and these tenants often
have no recourse in states without LGBT protections.”).
292 See Tara Parker-Pope, In Sickness and in Health, Regardless of Gender, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2010, at D5 (noting the frequency of same-sex partners denied full visitation rights to see a partner
or adopted child).
293 See, e.g., Scott James, An Unlikely Plaintiff. At Issue? He Dares Not Speak Its Name., N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A19A (recounting the plight of a plaintiff who lost his partner and was
unable to hold on to their cats and shared belongings).
294 See John Schwartz, Gay Couples Begin Attack on U.S. Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2010, at A20 (discussing how special rules for estate taxes apply to same-sex couples).
295 See, e.g., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Same-Sex Couples, IRS (Aug. 4, 2012),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-Same-Sex-Couples (“Same-sex
partners may not file using a married filing separately or jointly filing status because federal law
does not treat same-sex partners as married for federal tax purposes.”).
296 E.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Marriage Law Is Challenged as Equaling Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A16 (describing how a longtime postal worker challenged the Defense of
Marriage Act as unconstitutional because he was not afforded the same health benefits for his
spouse as were his married heterosexual co-workers).
297 See Associated Press, National Briefing: New England; Massachusetts: Husbands Reunited,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2010, at A14 (describing how a Brazilian man needed the assistance of Senator
John Kerry to gain admittance to the country in his effort to reunite with his husband).
298 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (“[T]he adoption of laws like those at issue in Romer v.
Evans and Lawrence, the longstanding ban on gays and lesbians in the military, and the absence of
federal protection for employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation show the
group to have limited political power . . . .”).
299 E.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (considering a
challenge to California’s Proposition 8), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.
2012); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (considering a challenge
to DOMA), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2012).
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received few favorable appellate holdings;300 the Ninth Circuit’s narrow
ruling in Perry v. Brown was handed down on February 7, 2012, nearly a year
after Holder issued his letter,301 and only recently did the Second Circuit
strike DOMA down under heightened scrutiny.302 For instance, even a
cursory survey of Title VII suits alleging employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation reveals the breadth and depth of societal animosity towards gay men and women.303
The bottom line is that “Congress has not yet seen fit . . . to provide
protection against such harassment.”304 While the Employment NonDiscrimination Act, which would allow disparate treatment and retaliation
claims for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,305 passed
the House in 2007306 and met with President Obama’s support,307 the bill
300 E.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he application of DOMA . . .
so as to deny Levenson’s request that his same-sex spouse receive federal benefits violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
301 See 671 F.3d at 1096 (holding that California’s Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
302 See Windsor v. United States, Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435, 2012 WL 4937310, at *10-13 (2d Cir.
Oct. 18, 2012).
303 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 760 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff Vickers allegedly left his job because coworkers terrorized him for openly associating with a gay doctor:
in addition to placing chemicals in his food and on his property, “Vickers’ co-workers repeatedly
touched his crotch with a tape measure, grabbed Vickers’ chest while making derogatory
comments, tried to shove a sanitary napkin in Vickers’ face, and simulated sex with a stuffed
animal and then tried to push the stuffed animal into Vickers’ crotch.” Id. at 760. Despite these
vivid accusations, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit. It held that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not “encompass sexual orientation as a prohibited
basis for discrimination.” Id. at 764.
Other circuits agree that Congress has provided no statutory remedy, despite consensus that
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation is intolerable. E.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33,
35 (2d Cir. 2000) (declaring such harassment “morally reprehensible whenever and in whatever
context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace,” but finding for the defendant); Higgins
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (describing harassment on
the basis of sexual orientation as “a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium,” but
finding for the defendant). Moreover, some courts have even flirted with disqualifying plaintiffs
who otherwise have valid Title VII sex-stereotyping cases, simply because they were gay. See, e.g.,
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] gender stereotyping claim
should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.” (quoting
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38) (internal citations omitted)). Only in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc.
did an appellate court expressly hold otherwise. See 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009) (“There is no
basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can
bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not.”); see also
HÉBERT, supra note 290, § 9:12 & n.3 (collecting cases).
304 Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001).
305 S. 811, 112th Cong. §§ 4–5 (2011); see also H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. §§ 4–5 (2011).
306 David M. Herszenhorn, House Backs Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2007, at A1.
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languishes yet again in committee.308 Whatever animates congressional
opposition to same-sex marriage, it is hard to fathom why members of
Congress withhold support from bills that narrowly aim to address animosity
toward gay men and women. Surely, Obama must have made the “inevitable inference” that congressional inaction “is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected.”309
Just as importantly, President Obama must have taken stock of the support he could count on following his nondefense decision. Before the
Holder Letter, lawsuits,310 high-profile figures’ coming out,311 and political
heavyweights speaking up during New York’s push for marriage equality312
all lent support to Obama’s decision. To further bolster his stance, Obama
could have publicly pointed to Washington, D.C.’s becoming, in 2010, the
sixth jurisdiction in the United States to allow same-sex marriage.313 In
addition, a prominent law firm, King & Spalding, withdrew from representing
Congress in its defense of DOMA.314 Holder summarized the change in
momentum: “[T]here is a growing acknowledgement that sexual orientation
‘bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.’”315
3. Has the Law Changed?
President Obama’s inquiry responded to shifts in the courts in the years
between the passage of DOMA and his nondefense decision. Before
Congress voted on DOMA, one of President Clinton’s Assistant Attorneys
307 See Civil Rights, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012).
308 See Thomas, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php (click “bill
number”; enter “S. 811” in textbox; click “search” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 11, 2012).
309 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
310 See, e.g., supra note 290.
311 E.g., Michael Luo, Former Republican Leader Discloses That He Is Gay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2010, at A16 (reporting that President George W. Bush’s former campaign manager revealed
that he is gay).
312 See Michael Barbaro, New Ads to Try to Build Public Support for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2010, at A22 (describing videos with celebrities such as Julianne Moore, Kyra Sedgwick,
Michael Bloomberg, and the Rev. Al Sharpton). Former President George W. Bush’s daughter
also made one such video. See Michael Barbaro, Daughter of Bush Endorses Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at A14.
313 Ian Urbina, Nation’s Capital Joins 5 States in Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2010, at A20.
314 Victor Li, King & Spalding Quits DOMA Case, Paul Clement Quits King & Spalding,
AMLAW DAILY (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/04/
domakandsclement.html (“The move comes after King & Spalding faced severe backlash and
criticism over its decision to represent the U.S. House.”).
315 See Holder Letter, supra note 2 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion)).
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General asserted rather flatly that the DOJ believed DOMA “would be
sustained as constitutional” since it presented “no legal issues.”316 But by the
time President Obama made the decision to stop defending DOMA, at least
two federal courts had found it unconstitutional. In Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management, a federal district court in Massachusetts held that, “even under
the highly deferential rational basis test,” DOMA is unconstitutional.317 The
Gill court dismissed all four objectives Congress asserted in the House
Report,318 and the First Circuit has since affirmed the district court’s
judgment (although only under rational basis review).319 And in the Ninth
Circuit, Judge Reinhardt had earlier determined that DOMA’s restriction
of federal benefits the plaintiff would otherwise have been entitled to under
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act was unconstitutional under the
rational basis standard, even though he “believe[d] it likely that some form
of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies.”320 Just days before Holder
sent his letter, at least one other court seemed to be moving in the same
direction.321
In addition, President Obama must have reasonably believed that the
Supreme Court will likely be at least somewhat receptive to Holder’s
nondefense argument. The Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas
struck down a Texas sodomy law criminalizing intimate same-sex conduct as
violative of the liberty that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment safeguards.322 In her concurrence in the judgment, Justice
O’Connor wrote that she would have relied instead on the Equal Protection

316
317

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 247, at 34 (letter of Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois).
699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). In the companion case to Gill, the same court
struck down DOMA as a violation of the Spending Clause, reasoning that “DOMA induces the
Commonwealth to violate the equal protection rights of its citizens” by “impos[ing] an unconstitutional condition [the denial of marriage-based benefits to same-sex couples] on the receipt of
federal funding.” Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234,
248-49 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1.
318 See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388-90.
319 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16 (“Under current Supreme Court authority, Congress’
denial of federal benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts has not been
adequately supported by any permissible federal interest.”).
320 In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009).
321 See Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1188-92 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (holding that the plaintiffs had made out cognizable equal protection and substantive due
process claims).
322 See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (O’Connor, J, concurring in the judgment) (“The petitioners
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”).
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Clause, albeit under the rational basis standard.323 One need not extrapolate
far from Justice O’Connor’s observation that “Texas’ sodomy law brands all
homosexuals as criminals” and “subjects [them] to ‘a lifelong penalty and
stigma,’”324 to conclude that sexual orientation should receive heightened
scrutiny. If Romer was the starting point, then Lawrence, especially in
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, points toward the Court’s eventually
agreeing with President Obama’s analysis—especially if his DOJ exerts its
influence.
4. Magnitude of the Ongoing Harm
President Obama almost certainly considered the magnitude of the ongoing harm caused by DOMA. As the Solicitor General, Donald Verrilli,
Jr., has asserted in his petition for Supreme Court review, “Authoritative
resolution of the question presented is of great importance to the United
States and to respondents and tens of thousands of others who are being
denied the equal enjoyment of the benefits that federal law makes available
to persons who are legally married under state law.”325 President Obama’s
actions—actions that only he, as President, could take326—bespeak his
recognition of this ongoing harm. For example, after one woman suffered a
fatal aneurysm,327 Obama directed the Department of Health and Human
Services to promulgate regulations requiring covered hospitals to allow
same-sex partners to visit their partners and serve as healthcare proxies.328
Obama also extended benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees in
mid-2009329 and directed the Department of Labor to allow gay federal
employees to take family and medical leave to care for same-sex partners
and the children of those partners.330 These solutions demonstrate his grasp
of the underlying harms DOMA creates, as well as his use of his institutional competence in beginning to address them.

323 Id. at 580. Justice O’Connor further explained that “moral disapproval” was not a legitimate basis for discriminating against a class of individuals. Id. at 582.
324 Id. at 581, 584 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)).
325 Solicitor General’s Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra note 132, at 13.
326 See supra subsection III.A.2.
327 Kevin Sack, In Hospital Decision, Obama Finds Safe Ground on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2010, at A9.
328 The regulations cover hospitals participating in Medicare and Medicaid programs. Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate Surrogate Decision
Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (Apr. 20, 2010).
329 Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,393 (June 22, 2009).
330 Robert Pear, Gay Workers Will Get Time to Care for Partner’s Sick Child, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2010, at A13.
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In sum, in making his nondefense decision, President Obama appropriately
evaluated (1) Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality (what Congress
actually reasoned at the time of enactment), (2) whether circumstances or (3)
the law had changed, and (4) the magnitude of the ongoing harm.
C. What Would the Court Do? President Obama
Seeks Judicial Resolution
Since the Court has not yet decided what level of scrutiny classifications
based on sexual orientation should receive,331 President Obama has room to
present his own constitutional views and seek judicial resolution as to their
merit. The Holder Letter reads like a hybrid of a statement of policy and a
legal brief, and for at least two courts, it has already proven to be the
missing piece of the puzzle to its constitutional holding.332 With this
advisory opinion, Obama has handed the courts an interpretive tool and
asked for a constitutional fix.
Furthermore, the DOJ has continued to seek judicial resolution of the
issue. In its brief in Pederson v. Office of Personnel Management, the DOJ
explained:
Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutionally discriminates. Section 3 treats
same-sex couples who are legally married under their states’ laws differently
than similarly situated opposite-sex couples, denying them the status,
recognition, and significant federal benefits otherwise available to married
persons. Under well-established factors set forth by the Supreme Court to
guide the determination whether heightened scrutiny applies to a classification that singles out a particular group, discrimination based on sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny. Under this standard of review, Section
3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.333

Then, applying Supreme Court precedent, the DOJ set forth a comprehensive argument for why classifications based on sexual orientation should
receive heightened scrutiny.334 Noting the Romer-based arguments discussed
earlier, the brief then applied heightened scrutiny to DOMA and argued

331
332

See Holder Letter, supra note 2.
See In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 574-76 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the Holder Letter’s analysis as “sound and consistent with the legislative history of DOMA” and quoting the
letter extensively); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677, 682 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refusing to apply
DOMA as “cause” for dismissing same-sex couple’s bankruptcy case and finding the Holder Letter
“relevant”).
333 DOJ’s Pederson Brief, supra note 240, at 1.
334 Id. at 8-27.
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that the statute failed to pass muster.335 The Pederson court agreed.
Although it decided to apply rational basis review because “the Supreme
Court has declined to afford [homosexuals] such [suspect] status,” the court
nonetheless concluded, after a lengthy discussion tracking the DOJ’s
argument, that “homosexuals warrant judicial recognition as a suspect
classification.”336 The DOJ’s approach has been consistent in other district
courts, as well.337
The DOJ has also advanced its position in the courts of appeals. After
Holder sent his letter, the DOJ called it to the First Circuit’s attention in
Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.338 The DOJ
properly asserted that it could still appeal, despite agreeing with the
plaintiffs that DOMA is unconstitutional.339 Weeks later, the DOJ extensively briefed its argument that classifications based on sexual orientation
should receive heightened scrutiny, under which DOMA, it asserted, is
unconstitutional.340
Indeed, in both district court litigation and appellate review, the DOJ
has considered its positions carefully to ensure judicial review of the equal
protection issue at the level of heightened scrutiny. For instance, while it
urged the First Circuit in Massachusetts to apply heightened scrutiny and
strike down DOMA,341 it also “opposed the separate Spending Clause and
335 Id. at 27-34; see also id. at 34 (“In sum, the official legislative record makes plain that
DOMA Section 3 was motivated in substantial part by animus toward gay and lesbian individuals
and their intimate relationships, and Congress identified no other interest that is materially
advanced by Section 3. Section 3 of DOMA is therefore unconstitutional.”).
336 Pederson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-1750, 2012 WL 3113883, at *16-35, *35 (D.
Conn. July 31, 2012).
337 See, e.g., DOJ’s Golinski Brief, supra note 240, at 3-18 (explaining why applying rational
basis to classifications based on sexual orientation is flawed and why the court should apply
heightened scrutiny).
338 See Letter from Tony West, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Margaret Carter,
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214). The decision in
Massachusetts resulted from the First Circuit’s consolidation of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), with Gill v. Office of Personnel
Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
339 See Joint Proposal Regarding Further Proceedings at 3-4, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207 & 10-2214); see also
supra note 224.
340 See Superseding Brief for the United States Department of Health and Human Services
at 21-22, Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1 (Nos. 10-2207 & 10-2214) [hereinafter DOJ’s Massachusetts Brief]
(“Under the well-established factors set forth by the Supreme Court to guide the determination
whether heightened scrutiny applies to a classification that singles out a particular group,
discrimination based of sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny. Under that standard of
review, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.”).
341 Id.
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Tenth Amendment claims pressed by the Commonwealth” of Massachusetts.342 By defending on these alternative grounds, the DOJ has sent the
unmistakable message that it wants the case decided on equal protection
grounds.
The DOJ has also sought to persuade courts to hold clearly and explicitly that heightened scrutiny must be applied to DOMA. The risk of narrow
holdings avoiding any ruling about the applicability of heightened scrutiny,
and thus a prolonged period of legal uncertainty, is quite real. Not only did
the First Circuit ultimately hold that “DOMA fails under the so-called
rational basis test, traditionally used in cases not involving ‘suspect’
classifications,”343 the Ninth Circuit also rested its holding, in California’s
same-sex marriage cases, on the narrowest possible equal protection
grounds.344
For this reason, the DOJ’s decision not to offer any rational basis arguments at all is tactically defensible.345 For instance, in a brief in Pederson, the
DOJ dispensed with any rational basis argument by pointing out simply
that “[a]lthough there is substantial authority in other circuits holding that
rational basis review generally applies to sexual orientation classifications,
most of those decisions fail to give adequate consideration to these enumerated factors [for deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny].”346 The
Holder Letter had stated not that the DOJ will argue the rational basis
position, but rather that, if told by the court that “the applicable standard is
rational basis,” the DOJ “will state that, consistent with the position it has
taken in prior cases, a reasonable argument for Section 3’s constitutionality
may be proffered under that permissive standard.”347 Consistent with this
stance, the DOJ’s arguments have proceeded to note summarily and
tangentially (e.g., in footnotes) that “if this Court holds that rational basis is
the appropriate standard, . . . a reasonable argument for the constitutionality of Section 3 can be made under that permissive standard.”348 Even after
the district court in Gill struck down DOMA because it “fails to pass
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis

342
343
344

Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 7.
Id. at 8.
See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Proposition 8’s infirmity
was just like that of Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), since it targeted a
minority group for the withdrawal of a right previously granted).
345 See supra note 223.
346 DOJ’s Pederson Brief, supra note 240, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
347 Holder Letter, supra note 2 (emphasis added); see also supra note 223 and accompanying text.
348 DOJ’s Golinski Brief, supra note 240, at 18 n.14 (emphasis added).
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test,”349 the DOJ refused to view DOMA at this level of scrutiny. In its
principal brief on appeal to the First Circuit, it offered no defenses of
DOMA under rational basis, but instead argued that the circuit’s “precedent
applying rational basis review to classifications based on sexual orientation
should be reconsidered.”350 Although the plaintiff had prevailed below, a
rational basis holding was not enough for the DOJ, which argued instead
that “the district court’s judgments should be affirmed on the ground that
Section 3 of DOMA is subject to heightened scrutiny.”351 A lingering
footnote still intoned that “a reasonable argument . . . can be made under”
rational basis,352 but it has become increasingly clear that none will be found
in the DOJ’s briefs.
The DOJ took a step further in its brief to the Second Circuit in Windsor v. United States.353 It admitted that “[n]early all other courts of appeals
have applied rational basis review to classifications based on sexual orientation” because those courts had failed adequately to “consider the factors the
Supreme Court has identified to guide the determination of whether
heightened scrutiny should apply.”354 Thus, the DOJ asserted, the Second
Circuit should “decline to adopt the reasoning of these out-of-circuit
decisions, and instead undertake a complete analysis of the appropriate level
of scrutiny applicable to classifications based on sexual orientation.”355 Its
advocacy seems to have worked356: Unlike the First Circuit in Massachusetts,
the Second Circuit agreed that “no permutation of rational basis review is
needed,” because “heightened scrutiny is available.”357 As the DOJ had
suggested, the court examined the “factors” that the Supreme Court uses
“to decide whether a new classification qualifies as a quasi-suspect class,”358
and concluded that “review of Section 3 of DOMA requires heightened
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356

Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010).
DOJ’s Massachusetts Brief, supra note 340, at 23.
Id.
Id. at 46 n.20.
Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435, 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012).
Brief for the United States at 33, Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310 (Nos. 12-2335 & 12-2435).
Id.
Indeed, it is telling that Judge Straub’s partial dissent explicitly took notice of DOJ’s
advocacy in nondefense. See Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310, at *15 (Straub, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (“[T]he Attorney General’s current position . . . is recently minted, and is . . .
unprecedented in its departure from the Department of Justice’s long-standing policy of
defending federal statutes even if the President disagrees as a matter of policy.”).
357 Windsor, 2012 WL 4937310, at *6 (majority opinion).
358 Id.; see also id. (listing these factors as a history of discrimination, relation of the class
characteristic to ability, discernibility of the characteristic (immutability), and political power
(citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)). For the application of these factors to the
President’s nondefense decision, see supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny”359 because “homosexuals are not in a position to adequately
protect themselves from the discriminatory wishes of the majoritarian
public.”360 The court held that DOMA failed to meet this standard.361
Finally, Solicitor General Verrilli has not only sought review of DOMA—
“so that the question may be authoritatively decided by th[e] Court,”362
since the Judiciary is the final arbiter of Section 3’s constitutionality—but
he has also done so strategically. Petitioning for certiorari in Massachusetts v.
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Verrilli notified the Court
that, in order to “ensure that [it] will have an appropriate vehicle in which
to resolve the issues presented in a timely and definitive fashion, the
government is also filing [simultaneously] a petition for a writ of certiorari
before judgment in Golinski.”363 Despite the rarity of petitioning for
certiorari before judgment, Verrilli, in September 2012, also sought review
of the decision of the district court in Windsor, before the Second Circuit
ruled just over a month later, so that if neither Massachusetts nor Golinski
“provide[d] an appropriate vehicle,” another case would be available.364
Given the ostensible concern as this Comment goes to press that Justice
Kagan may have to recuse herself from consideration of Massachusetts due to
her former role as Solicitor General,365 these decisions make good tactical
sense. After the Second Circuit’s heightened-scrutiny decision in Windsor,
Verrilli renewed the petition with a supplemental brief asking the Court to
take Windsor over Massachusetts or Golinski because the Court is “no
longer . . . faced with the decision whether to grant certiorari before
judgment.”366 And perhaps more importantly, unlike the Massachusetts
court, the Windsor court could offer analysis more “beneficial to th[e]
Court’s consideration,” as it was unbound by circuit precedent establishing
“the applicable level of scrutiny.”367

359
360
361
362
363
364

Id.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10-13.
Solicitor General’s Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra note 132, at 12.
Id. at 23.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 10, United States v. Windsor, No.
12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/
10/12-307-Petition.pdf.
365 See Lyle Denniston, Kagan, DOMA, and Recusal, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012, 4:59
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/kagan-doma-and-recusal.
366 Supplemental Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307
(U.S. Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/12307-Supplement-to-Petition.pdf.
367 Id. at 10.
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All in all, the most important point is that President Obama and the
DOJ have sought to influence courts’ decisions by persuading them to apply
heightened scrutiny to their review of DOMA. Consistent with the Holder
Letter, the Solicitor General maintains that “Section 3 of DOMA fails
under heightened scrutiny” because it “does not substantially advance any
important governmental purpose that motivated” its enactment.368 Further,
Solicitor General Verrilli’s petitions for certiorari carefully explain to the
Court why rational basis review is the incorrect standard to apply. Noting
the moral disapproval and animosity that motivated the statute—the desire
“not to further a proper legislative end but to make [gays] unequal to
everyone else”369—Verrilli explained that the “First Circuit, like every other
court of appeals that has addressed the issue to date,” had failed to provide
“an explanation” for its conclusion that rational basis should apply to
“classifications based on sexual orientation.”370 Indeed, he continued,
“[s]ubsequent decisions of this Court have undermined” the reasoning of
the appellate courts that rational basis should apply to classifications based
on sexual orientation.371 With such advocacy, the Solicitor General, like the
DOJ, has gone past prediction to influence. At the same time, however, the
President’s litigators have continued to respect the separation of powers by
consistently supporting congressional intervention in the litigation.372
*

*

*

As I suggest in my modifications to Dellinger’s model, Presidents deciding
whether to defend statutes that strike them as unconstitutional under equal
protection doctrine should consider not only descriptively what the Court
might do, but also normatively what it should do. Indeed, Obama and the
DOJ have sought to influence judicial decisions by persuading courts to
apply heightened scrutiny to their review of DOMA. And a year after his
DOMA letter, Holder sent Speaker Boehner another letter to inform
368
369

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
370 Id. at 18-19.
371 Id. at 20.
372 In seeking Supreme Court review of DOMA, the Solicitor General explained that, although the DOJ “declined to defend” DOMA, it “did not oppose the subsequent intervention by
[the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, on behalf of the House of Representatives] for the purpose
of presenting arguments in support of the constitutionality of Section 3.” Solicitor General’s
Massachusetts Certiorari Petition, supra note 132, at 12-13 n.3. The Solicitor General reiterated that
“with the case now before this Court on this petition filed by the Executive Branch petitioners, it
is appropriate for [the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group] to present arguments in defense of the
validity of the measure.” Id.
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Congress that the DOJ had determined that 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(3) and 101(31)
(defining the “surviving spouse” of a veteran as only “a person of the
opposite sex”373) are unconstitutional for the same reasons that DOMA is
unconstitutional.374 The sum total of these actions shows President Obama’s
recognition of the importance of not simply predicting the Court’s actions,
but also of influencing them. Judges are wary of constitutional challenges:
“Invalidating a federal statute is an unwelcome responsibility for federal
judges; the elected Congress speaks for the entire nation, its judgment and
good faith being entitled to utmost respect.”375 But when the time comes
that that deference is misplaced, and it may continue to permit majoritarian
tyranny, the President has a responsibility to help alert the courts that that
deference is no longer warranted.
CONCLUSION
The 1994 Dellinger framework for presidential nonenforcement of statutes applies equally well—and in some respects better—to Executive
decisions not to defend statutes that the President believes to be unconstitutional. The degree of authority the President has under the Take Care
Clause to make such decisions varies. But when the President believes that
a statute is unconstitutional under equal protection principles, he has a
heightened responsibility to consider alerting the Court to the statute’s
constitutional defects, a task that he can accomplish through nondefense.
The nondefense decision may encourage the Court to review a statute or
government action under heightened scrutiny.
President Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA is a paradigmatic case
of deliberative nondefense decisionmaking. Retrospectively applying the
modified nondefense model to Obama’s determination reveals that he
appropriately reflected on his duty under the Take Care Clause while
simultaneously engaging in repeal efforts. President Obama then assessed
Congress’s actual contemporaneous rationality in passing DOMA. In
response to the specter of animosity inherent in Congress’s rationale, and
the clarity of changed sociopolitical circumstances, President Obama
appropriately concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation
should receive heightened scrutiny and that advancing this argument would
help courts reach the same conclusion.
373
374

38 U.S.C. § 101(3), 101(31) (2006).
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
boehner02-17-12.pdf.
375 Id.
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In addition, by continuing to enforce DOMA while advancing exhaustive reasoning in litigation for its unconstitutionality, Obama has facilitated
judicial resolution of the issue and respected the separation of powers.
Implicit in Obama’s decisionmaking, and the DOJ’s following in the same
vein, are some of the considerations not fully elaborated by the Dellinger/
Johnsen framework: presidential nondefense decisions depend on the nature
of the underlying constitutional values at stake. Those decisions, and the
authority to make them, become weightier when the underlying value is
equal protection threatened by majoritarian tyranny.

